Friday, 30 July 1943

As recorded: "30th July, 1943."

recE4quX5KHMzVP8x p. 9

Signal Text

COPY.
APPENDIX "E"
FROM: HEADQUARTERS, No 3 (S.A.) WING.
TO: OFFICERS COMMANDING, No's 12 - 21 & 24 (SAAF) SQUADRONS.
DATE: 30th July, 1943.
REF: 3W/7/3.
MOVE OF UNITS.
Following signal received from H.Q. T.B.F.
You are requested to take note of new arrangements indicated by the signal.
"O 5II 29/7 Secret.
Owing to hold up in shipping movement likely to be delayed. Units requested to be at 48 hours readiness. 3 SAAF to prepare all Squadrons for movement and not 21 Sqdn. only. Detailed instructions will follow as soon as possible.
BT 292130."
(sgd). J.B. ? ?
Capt. for Col.
OFFICER COMMANDING No. 3 (S.A.) WING.

Transcriber's Notes

TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES
* Abbreviations Expanded:
* S.A. / S.A.A.F. / SAAF: South African Air Force.
* No's: Numbers.
* REF: Reference.
* H.Q. / HQ: Headquarters.
* T.B.F.: Tactical Bomber Force.
* Sqdn.: Squadron.
* (sgd): Signed.
* Capt.: Captain.
* Col.: Colonel.
* Observations about Individuals:
* Colonel, Officer Commanding No. 3 (S.A.) Wing: While the signature is by a Captain on his behalf, the Colonel (likely Colonel H.J. Martin) was the senior commander managing the movement of the entire wing.
* Capt. J.B. ? ?: The Captain signing the document appears to be an administrative officer at Wing Headquarters. His role was to disseminate urgent "Secret" operational signals to the subordinate squadrons (12, 21, and 24 Squadrons) to ensure they maintained a state of "48 hours readiness".
* Information about the Location:
* Tunis Area, Tunisia: Although not named on this specific page, the previous movement order (Appendix "C") confirms these units were being funneled through the Tunis Transit Area to board ships for the European theater.
* Modern Name: Tunis remains the capital of Tunisia. During July 1943, its port facilities were clogged with Allied shipping preparing for the ongoing campaign in Sicily.
* Historical Theatre Context:
* The Shipping Bottleneck: This memorandum captures the logistical friction inherent in large-scale amphibious operations. By July 30, 1943, the invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky) was in its third week. The "hold up in shipping" likely resulted from the priority given to reinforcing infantry and heavy armor over moving the ground echelons of air wings.
* Broadening the Move: The signal clarifies that the move was no longer restricted to just 21 Squadron, but now required the entire 3 SAAF Wing to be prepared for transit. This suggests a major redeployment of the Wing's light-medium bomber force to new bases closer to the Italian front.
* Combat Readiness: Being at "48 hours readiness" meant that all ground equipment, vehicles, and personnel had to be packed and prepared to move to the docks on two days' notice.
* The Aircraft: At this stage of the war, 21 Squadron S.A.A.F. was flying the Martin Baltimore, a light-medium bomber used for tactical interdiction.
* Tactical Bomber Force (T.B.F.): This was the parent Allied command structure that directed the operations of the light and medium bomber units in the Mediterranean. The signal originated from T.B.F. at 2130 hours on the 29th, demonstrating the rapid relay of "Secret" operational intelligence down to the squadron level.

11
The date written in the 'DATE' line of the memorandum is 26th August, 43.