HAZBUB MAIN.

R.A.F. Form 441 A. "W" 37 SORTIE REPORT (Part A.) NIGHT OPERATION Sheet No. 1. Oprep. Ref. No. 266 Date 15/16.4.43 Squadron. 21 SAAF Type of Aircraft. 1 Baltimore Aircraft No. 940 V Aircraft Letter. "W" "V" Captain Lt. Col. Coppen D.F.C. Crew. Capt. Farrant (Observer) F/Sgt. Bradfield (W.Op.A.G.) F/Sgt. Lyne (A/Gunner) Time Up. 2200 hrs. Time Down. 0106 hrs. Total Time. 3 hrs. 6 mins. Aerodrome or L.G. HAZBUB MAIN. Type of Cloud. Over Target: Cu. & St. Cu. Amount of Cloud. 8/10 Base of Cloud. 500 ft. (Tops 6,000 ft.) Visibility. Very poor. General Weather. Poor. Map or Chart Reference. TUNISIA 1:500,000 TUNIS Task or Duty. Very careful offensive reconnaissance for shipping in area between K 5115 and K 9172 and ten miles out to sea. Time. Height. Place. Narrative. 2200 HAZBUB Airborne and S/C 351 M. 2249 1000 Landfall SE ZARAT, on track. 2327 4000 KNEISS A/C for HAMMAMET 005 M. 2343 7000. Above 8/10 Strato-Cu. HAMMAMET seen ahead. Losing height to get below cloud. 2346 3500 Seven miles EAST of HAMMAMET. In 8/10 cloud and losing height. 2355 1000 MENZEL TEMIME to port. Still above St. Cu. cloud. Turning and climbing. Visibility very poor. 0005 5000 NABEUL Bombing coast road NORTH of NABEUL. 0006 5000 Off target and flying parallel to coast on Southerly course. 0040 5500 HAMMAMET S/C 180 M for KNEISS. 0055 2000 KNEISS A/C for HAZBUB. 176 M. 0100 500 HAZBUB 0106 " Landed. PART B (on reverse) to be completed according to relevant pro-formas in H.Q. R.A.F. M.E. Instruction 34. P/PME-200.000-3/42 P.T.O. BA Careful Reconnaissance for shipping in area between p. K 5115 and K 9172 and ten miles out to sea. (Alternative target: Coast road between the above pinpoints or road leading to TUNIS) BB From 2316 hrs. to 2348 hrs. BC Medium level bombing attack from 5000 ft. 6 x 250 lb. GP 43 Det. (Rods) BD Owing to the very poor visibility and low cloud base, observation of this area was practically impossible. The A/C flew up the coast to a point 8 miles EAST of MENZEL TEMIME, turned inland and bombed the road NORTH of NABEUL through a break in the cloud. No results of bombing run were observed, and no movement was seen in the whole area. BE 3 S/L and HAA firing up the beams encountered from HAMMAMET when going to & returning from the target. Fairly intense but very inaccurate. Inaccurate LAA from KORBA SOUTH L.G. BF The A/C, on account of undercarriage trouble, had to crash-land at base. None of the crew were hurt. BG Nil. BH Ack/Ack flashes and bomb-bursts seen from BIR BOU REBKA L.G. [Handwritten Signature] ........................ Capt. S.I.O. 21 SQUADRON, S.A.A.F.

1943-04-16 HAZBUB MAIN.

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Form 541

MAP

Transcriber's Notes

Phase 2: Technical Expansion Glossary of Terms * R.A.F.: Royal Air Force. * SAAF: South African Air Force. * Oprep.: Operational Report. * Lt. Col.: Lieutenant Colonel. * D.F.C.: Distinguished Flying Cross. * Capt.: Captain. * F/Sgt.: Flight Sergeant. * W.Op.A.G.: Wireless Operator / Air Gunner. * A/Gunner: Air Gunner. * L.G.: Landing Ground. * Cu. & St. Cu.: Cumulus and Stratocumulus (cloud types). * S/C: Set Course. * M.: Magnetic (heading). * A/C: Alter Course. * H.Q. R.A.F. M.E.: Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East. Operational Context The sortie conducted by Baltimore 940 'V' on the night of 15/16 April 1943 occurred during the final weeks of the Tunisia Campaign. The strategic objective was the interdiction of Axis maritime traffic attempting to supply or evacuate the North African bridgehead. Specifically, the mission tasked the crew with an offensive reconnaissance of the eastern coastline of the Cap Bon peninsula, between grid references K 5115 and K 9172. The chronological narrative details a flight path from Landing Ground Hazbub Main to landfall southeast of Zarat. The aircraft proceeded over Kneiss toward the Cap Bon region. Dense cloud cover (8/10ths Stratocumulus with bases at 500 feet) severely impeded the primary shipping search. At 2355 hours, near Menzel Temime, the crew found visibility to be "very poor" despite attempts to lose altitude and get below the cloud deck. Unable to locate maritime targets, the crew exercised secondary mission protocols by attacking a terrestrial target of opportunity: the coast road north of Nabeul at 0005 hours. This road served as a critical logistical artery for the German 15th Panzer Division and Italian units defending the eastern sector of the Enfidaville line. The mission concludes with the aircraft returning to Hazbub Main via Kneiss. The leadership of the sortie by Lt. Col. Coppen, the Commanding Officer of 21 Squadron, underscores the technical difficulty and tactical importance of these night reconnaissance operations during the Allied push to conclude the Tunisian theater. 52 Phase 1: Verification & Extraction Identity Check: 15/16.4.43 Phase 2: Technical Expansion Glossary of Terms * A/C: Aircraft. In this specific sortie, the aircraft was a Martin Baltimore Mk. III, serial number 940 'V'. * GP: General Purpose bomb. The 250 lb. GP bomb was a standard medium-yield weapon used for interdiction of soft targets like road networks. * Det. (Rods): Detonators (specifically "Tail Rod" fuzing). These rods extended from the nose of the bomb to ensure an instantaneous burst above or at ground level, maximizing the fragmentation effect against surface targets like roads or vehicles. * S/L: Searchlights. These were used by Axis ground defenses to illuminate Allied aircraft for anti-aircraft gunners. * HAA: Heavy Anti-Aircraft fire. Typically referring to large-caliber guns like the German 8.8 cm Flak, which targeted aircraft at medium to high altitudes. * LAA: Light Anti-Aircraft fire. Refers to rapid-fire, smaller caliber weapons (e.g., 20mm or 37mm) used for low-altitude defense. * L.G.: Landing Ground. Temporary or semi-permanent airfields used by both Allied and Axis forces during the North African campaign. * Ack/Ack: Slang for Anti-Aircraft fire. * S.I.O.: Squadron Intelligence Officer. * S.A.A.F.: South African Air Force. Operational Context This mission occurred during the final weeks of the Tunisian Campaign, as Allied forces applied maximum pressure on the "Tunis Bridgehead." By mid-April 1943, Axis forces were largely confined to the Cap Bon peninsula and the areas immediately surrounding Tunis and Bizerte. The primary task—reconnaissance for shipping ten miles out to sea between grid points K 5115 and K 9172—was part of the broader Allied "Operation Flax" and subsequent efforts to maintain a total blockade on Axis supply lines. Preventing the arrival of supplies and the eventual evacuation of the German and Italian armies was the paramount strategic objective for the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF). The tactical shift to an "alternative target"—the coast road north of Nabeul—highlights the flexibility required of 21 Squadron crews when faced with the "very poor visibility" and "low cloud base" typical of seasonal Mediterranean weather. Interdicting the road networks around Nabeul and Hammamet served to disrupt the movement of the German 15th Panzer Division and other units repositioning for a final stand. The presence of inaccurate but "fairly intense" defenses at Hammamet and Korba South L.G. confirms that the Axis maintained significant defensive clusters to protect their remaining logistical hubs and landing grounds on the peninsula. The reporting of activity from Bir Bou Rebka L.G. further illustrates the concentration of active military sites in this shrinking pocket of Axis-held territory. 53 Phase 1: Verification & Extraction Identity Check: 17 APR 43.