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Operation No. 292

PANTELLERIA HARBOUR

Monday, 10 May 1943

Over target: 1630 hrs Landed: 1730 hrs Time: 14:59 hrs

Sortie Report (Form 541)

Duty
Medium level bombing attack on PANTELLERIA Harbour. Time. Height. Place
R.A.F. Form 441 A.SORTIE REPORT 99 "L"(Part A.) Second Operation of Day.Sheet No. 1Oprep. Ref. No. 292Date. 10 MAY 43Squadron. 21 SAAF.Type of Aircraft. 17 Baltimores.Aircraft No. See Reverse.Aircraft Letter. "Leader of Formation:Captain Lt.Col. Coppen D.F.C.Crew. Capt. Farrant (Observer).See reverse.Time Up. 1459 hrs. (1st. A/C)Time Down. 1730 hrs. (Last A/C)Total Time. 39 hrs. 40 mins.Aerodrome or L.G. EL DJEM MAIN.Type of Cloud. St.Cu.Amount of Cloud. Thin scattered layer.Base of Cloud. 4000 ft.Visibility. Good.General Weather. Fine.Map or Chart Reference. TUNISIA 1:500,000 Sheet NJ.32.SE TUNIS. Target Map P/7.Task or Duty. Medium level bombing attack on PANTELLERIA Harbour.Time. Height. Place. Narrative.1459 EL DJEM Airborne & Circling.1519 500 " S/C DJEBINIANA.1528 500 DJEB. A/C for RAS KABOUDIA.1538 500 RAS. K. A/C for SOUSSE.1556 500 SOUSSE Picked up fighter escort (239 Wing) and S/C for PANTELLERIA. 045 M.1617 500 - 9 Climbing.1630 9000 TARGET Bombed course 060 deg. Left hand turn off target. S/C 230 M for MONASTIR.1705 500 MONASTIR Made landfall. A/C 200 M for EL DJEM.1730 EL DJEM Last A/C landed.PART B (on reverse) to be completed according to relevant pro-forma in H.Q. R.A.F. M.E. Instruction 34./PMEJ-200.000 - 3/42 P.T.O.PART "B"BA PANTELLERIA Harbour.BB 1630 hrs. L.T.BC Medium level bombing attack from 8/9,000 ft.60 x 250 lb. GP 43 Det. with Rods.42 x 250 lb. GP 43 Det. without rods.BD Target was attacked on a course of 060 deg. Leader's bombs hungup for a moment and most of the sticks overshot the target.Sticks fell from figure 17 to pp. 9 across some small boats;from pp. 16 to Sq. G 17; and from pp. 18 to square I 17. Onestick fell in the sea NORTH of pp. 9. About a dozen small boatsor barges. seen inside the WESTERN and EASTERN jetties.BE An intense curtain of HAA was put up after bombing. This wasaccurate for height but too late. Some very large black burstsof A/A seen again. Guns were firing from WEST of L.G. and fromthe harbour area.BF Nil.BG Verticals and obliques of harbour and bomb-bursts and obliquesof the L.G.BH Large unfilled craters on the L.G. No fires burning. 10,000-tonship stationary off RAS MOSTAFA (Cape Bon headland.)List of A/C and Crews:F/L 951 V Lt.Col.Coppen, Capt. Farrant, F/Sgts. Bradfield & Lyne.221 Y Lt. Pocock, Sgt. Edmeades (RAF), Sgt. Jensen(RCAF) & F/S Carbarns.181 T Lt. Carr, Lt. Lombaard, F/Sgts. Toms & Wright.V/L 877 J Lt. Gardener, Lt. Kerr, F/Sgts. Pearce & Green.179 A Lt. Dugmore, Lt. Masters, F/Sgts. Maasdorp & Rogers C.L.176 YY Maj. Schravesande, Lt. Herring, F/Sgts. Meyer & Stopforth.B/L 903 O Capt. Cormack, Lt. Mulholland, F/Sgts. Finberg & McGee.957 W Lt. Wood, Lt. Gould, F/Sgts. Purdon & Groenewald.362 X Lt. Clutterbuck, Lt. v.d.Meulen, F/Sgts. Raeburn & Fraser.V/L 142 P Lt. Liddiard, Lt. Pickerill, F/Sgts. Zaaiman & Oliff.916 SS Lt. Hargrave, Lt. Rees, Sgt. McQueen (RCAF) & F/Sgt. Bedford.B/L [Handwritten Strike-through] 226 H Capt. Ord, Lt. Hodges, F/Sgt. Walker & A/Sgt. Devenish.271 F Lt. Guard, Lt. Forseman, F/Sgt. Steven & F/Sgt. Prout (RAF)977 L Lt.Oakes, Lt. Sachs, Sgts. Morrison & Cleland (RCAF)V/L 930 K Lt. Hamilton, Lt. Whittle, F/Sgts. Rogers F.D. & Phelan.108 B Lt. A'Bear, Lt. Owen-Hughes, F/Sgts. Harrison & Pickup.290 C Lt. Elieden, Lt. Rose, F/Sgts. Jarvis & Mendelsohn.F/L Formation Leader. B/L Box Leader. V/L Vic Leader.[Handwritten Signature]........................Capt.S.I.O. 21 SQUADRON, S.A.A.F.

Transcriber's Notes

Oprep. Ref. No
Operational Report Reference Number.
SAAF
South African Air Force.
Baltimores
Martin Baltimore twin-engine light bombers used for medium-level tactical interdiction.
D.F.C
Distinguished Flying Cross.
A/C
Aircraft (referring to time up/down) or Altered Course (within the narrative section).
A/C
Aircraft.
L.G
Landing Ground.
L.G
Landing Ground.
St.Cu
Stratocumulus (cloud type).
S/C
Set Course.

R.A.F. Form 441 A.: Royal Air Force standard form for reporting narrative and technical details of an air sortie.

deg.: Degrees.

deg.: Degrees (referring to the bombing heading).

pp.: Pinpoints, referring to specific map coordinates or target landmarks.

S.I.O. 21 SQUADRON, S.A.A.F.: Squadron Intelligence Officer, 21 Squadron, South African Air Force. Operational Context The mission conducted at 1630 hours on 10 May 1943 represents the second major tactical strike of the day for 21 Squadron SAAF during the initiation of Operation Corkscrew. Following the collapse of Axis resistance on the Tunisian mainland on 7 May, the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) shifted their full strategic weight toward the isolation and neutralization of the island of Pantelleria. The island's harbour was a primary objective to prevent any residual Axis maritime movements or evacuation attempts across the Strait of Sicily. Strategically, the 17 Martin Baltimores—led by Lt. Col. Coppen, D.F.C.—targeted maritime assets including approximately a dozen small boats and barges identified within the harbor's jetties. The deployment of mixed ordnance indicates a dual-intent: 60 bombs with "Rod" fuzes for surface fragmentation damage and 42 without rods for infrastructural impact. However, technical failure hindered the strike's precision; the Leader's bombs "hung up" momentarily, causing most sticks to overshoot the intended aiming points. Tactically, the formation faced "intense" Heavy Anti-Aircraft (HAA) fire from batteries west of the Landing Ground and within the harbor area. While the Axis gunners achieved accuracy for height, the barrage was "too late," reflecting the inability of the isolated garrison to effectively track the fast-moving Baltimore formations at 8,000–9,000 feet. Intelligence gathered via oblique photography also identified a significant 10,000-ton vessel stationary off Ras Mostafa, underscoring the ongoing air-sea blockade. This archival record documents the systematic degradation of Axis resources that eventually compelled the island's unprecedented surrender solely due to tactical air power in June 1943. 135