Sortie Report (Form 541)
- Duty
- Medium level bombing attack on MT and dug-in positions. Time. Height. Place
Transcriber's Notes
- Baltimores
- Refers to the Martin Baltimore light bombers of No. 21 Squadron S.A.A.F..
- Lt/Col. Irvine
- Lieutenant Colonel A. D. Irvine, the Officer Commanding (O.C.) of No. 21 Squadron S.A.A.F., who served as the formation leader for this mission.
- LG. 98
- Landing Ground 98, the squadron's operational base in Egypt during the El Alamein offensive.
- MT
- Mechanical Transport. Refers to Axis motorized vehicles, including trucks and troop carriers.
- MT
- Mechanical Transport, referring to Axis motorized vehicles, including trucks and troop carriers.
- H.Q. R.A.F. M.E
- Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East. Operational Context: This Sortie Report documents the "Second Show" of 24 October 1942, the first full day of daylight operations following the launch of the Second Battle of El Alamein. Strategically, the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) were tasked with intense interdiction of Axis reserve lines to support the Eighth Army's ground breakthrough. The specific target for this mission involved Axis "MT and dug-in positions" located along the coastal sector west of Sidi Abd El Rahman. The mission was a high-stakes leadership flight led by the Squadron Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Irvine. It employed a joint formation of six Martin Baltimores from No. 21 Squadron S.A.A.F. integrated with a larger force of twelve Douglas Bostons from No. 24 Squadron S.A.A.F.. This combined force, protected by a fighter escort, aimed to saturate the target area with ordnance to disrupt German-Italian logistical movement and defensive reinforcement. Tactical execution required a significant altitude adjustment due to weather. Despite a planned release, the formation encountered "10/10" cloud cover with a base at 7,000 feet. To maintain visual contact with the target, the formation bombed from the relatively low altitude of 6,500 feet on a course of 195 degrees. Intelligence reports from the same mission (OPREP 102) confirm this resulted in "Direct hits on road," effectively severing local supply lines. This document, archived as Folio 63, highlights the DAF's ability to adapt tactics to meteorological constraints to maintain the relentless tempo required during the definitive breakthrough in North Africa. 82
- Ack/Ack
- Anti-Aircraft artillery fire.
- E/A
- Enemy Aircraft.
- A/C
- Aircraft.
- Second Show
- The roster for the second major operational mission (or "show") executed by the squadron on this date.
R A.F. Form 441 A.: Royal Air Force Sortie Report form, the primary operational record for individual combat flights.
Oprep. Ref. No. 102: Operational Report reference number 102.
ft.: Feet, the unit of measurement for the cloud base.
pp. 860296: Point position (grid coordinates) 860296 on the El Daba map sheet, identifying the southern limit of the target area.
250 G.P. 43 Det. with rods: 250-pound General Purpose high-explosive bombs fitted with No. 43 tail pistols and nose extension rods. These "daisy cutter" rods were designed to trigger detonation above the desert floor to maximize lateral fragmentation blast against "MT and dug-in positions".
ft.: Feet, the unit of measurement for the altitude during the photo-reconnaissance run. Operational Context: This Sortie Report (Part B) details the tactical results of the "Second Show" of 24 October 1942, conducted during the initial daylight phase of the Second Battle of El Alamein. Strategically, the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) focused on direct interdiction of Axis reserve lines to facilitate the Eighth Army's ground breakthrough. The target area formed a critical corridor for German-Italian reinforcements, extending from the coast west of Sidi Abd El Rahman south toward El Daba. The tactical delivery was highly effective despite significant "Cloud" interference. The report confirms "Direct hits observed on road," a primary objective for halting Axis logistical movement. The use of extension rods on the thirty-six 250lb G.P. bombs ensured that the ordnance detonated at an optimal height to shred the "MT and dug-in positions" listed in section BA. Intelligence observations in section BH are of significant value to the Desert Air Force (DAF). The detection of a "Concentration of about 100 MT" within a specific triangle of coordinates, accompanied by "Four fires and much activity," indicates a major Axis assembly area or logistical hub being actively suppressed. Furthermore, the precise identification of two heavy anti-aircraft batteries—one consisting of six guns at 867298—provided critical data for subsequent suppression-of-enemy-air-defenses (SEAD) sorties. The lack of enemy aircraft (E/A) and the absence of Baltimore losses (Nil) suggest that the combined formation, led by Lieutenant Colonel Irvine, successfully exploited the local air superiority established during the preceding airfield neutralization campaign. This document, archived as Folio 63, remains a primary record of the tactical precision and intelligence-gathering capabilities of the SAAF light bomber wings during the definitive breakthrough in Egypt. 83
900 E / 879 K / 933 L / 955 A / 942 G / 915 S: Individual aircraft serial numbers and their corresponding identification letters (E, K, L, A, G, S) assigned to the Martin Baltimore light bombers.