Total Time. 1115 98

SORTIE REPORT R.A.F. Form 441 A. (Part A.) 57 [Handwritten] Flight No. 1 Oprep. Ref. No. 99 Date. 22/10/42 Squadron. 21 SAAF. Type of Aircraft. 4 Bostons of 12 Sqdn. Captain Aircraft No. and 14 Baltimores of Crew. Leader: Maj. Coppen Aircraft Letter. 21 Squadron. ( ( See attached list. Time Up. Time Down. 0938 Aerodrome or L.G. Total Time. 1115 98 1 hr. 37 mins. Type of Cloud. Cumulus Map or Chart Amount of Cloud. 9/10 (Over target) Reference. Visibility. Approx. 5000 1:250000 General Weather. Bad, over target,otherwise good. Egypt and Cyrenaica Cloudy: otherwise good. Sheet 14 El Daba. Task or Duty. Medium level bombing attack on L.G. 20 Time. Height. Place. Narrative. LG. 98 Baltimores airborne. Route out 284°. Turned in at Ras-el-Daba between road and railway line on to target. Turned out due North to sea for 7 or 8 miles and returned on course of 100° and made landfall at El Hamam. 1033 9300 Target Formation bombed on course of 270° LG. 98 Baltimores landed. (Handwritten Signature: [Illegible]) PART B (on reverse) to be completed according to relevant pro-forma in H.Q. R.A.F. M.E. Instruction 34. PMEJ - 200.000 - 3/42 P.T.O. Part "B". BA L.G. 20. BB 1033 hrs. BC Medium level bombing attack from 9000 ft. 80 x 250 G.P. 43 detonator with rods. 4 x 250 hang-ups were jettisoned over the sea. BD All bombs in target area. No results observed. BE Heavy and accurate, but not intense. Encountered just after turning away from target. No enemy A/C encountered. BF Nine Baltimores holed—none badly. BG A/C 141 M took 8 obliques and A/C 955 A took 11 verticals. All were failures on account of cloud. BH Two unidentified single-engined A/C seen going down out of control at 1042 hrs. p.p. 859325. One big camp (tents and people) seen at p.p. 825319 to 834322. Noticeable feature was the large number of people. These were not formed up. There was no transport on the road. A big red patch was seen in the sea at p.p. 852325. (Handwritten Signature: [Illegible]) AIR CREWS A/C 141 M A/C 877 J A/C 870 E

Pilot: Capt. Rhodes Lt. Gardener Lt. Golding Observer: Lt. Hudson Lt. Kerr Lt. Mulholland Gunners: A/Sgt. Stringer A/Sgt. Lane A/Sgt. Dyson A/Sgt. H.-Barber A/Sgt. Brown A/Sgt. Green oooooooooooooooooooooooo

A/C 879 K A/C 933 L A/C 955 A

Lt. Chisholm Lt. Meredith Lt. A. R. Martin Lt. Campbell Lt. Baillie Lt. Sadler A/Sgt. Hodgkinson A/Sgt. Smith F/Sgt. Lotter A/Sgt. de Villiers A/Sgt. O’Regan F/Sgt. Palmer oooooooooooooooooooooooo

A/C 949 AA A/C 942 G A/C 940 V

Lt. Hamilton Lt. Carlisle Maj. Coppen Lt. Whittle Lt. Simon Lt. Farrant A/Sgt. Rogers A/Sgt. Waldek Lt. Noakes A/Sgt. Phelan A/Sgt. Schumann A/Sgt. Bradfield oooooooooooooooooooooooo

A/C 873 N A/C 864 Z A/C 915 S

Lt. Pocock Lt. G. Martin Lt. Cormack Lt. Cliff Lt. Gibson Lt. Webber A/Sgt. B. Thomas A/Sgt. Oliff A/Sgt. Finberg A/Sgt. Clark A/Sgt. Abraham A/Sgt. McGeer oooooooooooooooooooooooo

A/C 909 X A/C 840 T

Lt. Heslop Lt. Carr Lt. Arnold Lt. Lombard A/Sgt. Bernitz A/Sgt. Toms A/Sgt. Cleck A/Sgt. Wright (Handwritten Signature: [Illegible])

1942-10-22 Total Time. 1115 98

__o_O_o__

Form 541

MAP

4 Bostons of 12 Sqdn. Captain

Capt. Rhodes Pilot

Lt. Hudson Observer

Transcriber's Notes

Phase 2: Technical Expansion (The "Transcriber's Notes") Glossary of Terms: * R.A.F. Form 441 A.: Royal Air Force Sortie Report form used for documenting the primary narrative and technical details of individual combat missions. * Oprep. Ref. No. 99: Operational Report reference number 99. * 21 SAAF / 12 Sqdn.: No. 21 and No. 12 Squadrons of the South African Air Force. * Bostons / Baltimores: Refers to the Douglas Boston and Martin Baltimore light bombers utilized by the Desert Air Force (DAF). * Maj. Coppen: Major Coppen, the designated formation leader for the flight. * Aerodrome or L.G. 98: Landing Ground 98, the operational base for No. 21 Squadron. * L.G. 20: Landing Ground 20, the primary Axis airfield targeted for neutralization. * 9300: Ninety-three hundred feet, the release altitude for the medium-level bombing run. * H.Q. R.A.F. M.E.: Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East. Operational Context: This Sortie Report (Part A) documents a major tactical effort on 22 October 1942, occurring during the final 24 hours of the Allied air preparation for the Second Battle of El Alamein. Strategically, the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) focused heavily on airfield suppression in the El Daba sector to ground Axis air power before the 8th Army's offensive. The narrative details a sophisticated flight path designed to mitigate Axis detection and ground fire. The formation used the "road and railway line" at Ras-el-Daba as a navigational fix for its run-in to the target, subsequently exiting "due North to sea" before returning to L.G. 98. This maritime egress was a standard tactical maneuver used to evade Axis interceptors and heavy anti-aircraft concentrations inland. The report notes significant weather impediments, with "9/10" cloud cover over the target area and "bad" visibility. This heavy cloud layer explains the "nil results observed" noted in the corresponding Intelligence Postagram (OPREP 99) despite the delivery of eighty 250lb G.P. bombs. Led by Major Coppen, this joint-squadron effort utilized the combined strength of fourteen Martin Baltimores and four Douglas Bostons to ensure maximum saturation of Landing Ground 20. This document, archived as Folio 57, represents the final large-scale light bomber strike of the pre-offensive phase, illustrating the persistence of Allied operations even in marginal weather conditions during the definitive breakthrough in Egypt. 74 Phase 1: Verification & Extraction Identity Check: No specific date is recorded on the reverse of this form (Part "B"); however, internal cross-referencing with the corresponding Sortie Report (Part A) on folio 57 identifies the mission date as 22/10/42. Phase 2: Technical Expansion (The "Transcriber's Notes") Glossary of Terms: * L.G. 20: Landing Ground 20. A forward Axis airfield located in the El Daba sector of Egypt. * ft.: Feet, the unit of measurement for the release altitude of 9,000 feet. * 250 G.P.: 250-pound General Purpose high-explosive bombs. * 43 detonator with rods: Refers to the No. 43 tail pistol/detonator used with "daisy cutter" extension rods on the nose. These rods triggered the bomb above ground level to maximize lateral fragmentation damage against soft targets like parked aircraft. * hang-ups: Ordnance that failed to release from the aircraft's bomb shackles during the primary attack. * A/C: Aircraft. Specifically, the Martin Baltimore light bombers of No. 21 Squadron SAAF. * obliques / verticals: Types of aerial reconnaissance photographs; vertical shots are taken straight down for mapping, while obliques are taken at an angle for perspective. * p.p.: Point position, referring to specific map grid coordinates used for intelligence reporting. Operational Context: This Sortie Report (Part B) details the results of Oprep 99, a medium-level strike on Landing Ground 20 conducted on 22 October 1942. Strategically, this raid took place during the final 24 hours preceding the launch of the Second Battle of El Alamein (23 October 1942). The Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) intensified these airfield suppression missions to neutralize the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica on the ground, ensuring Allied air superiority for the 8th Army's ground offensive. The mission faced significant environmental challenges, as "bad visibility" and heavy cloud cover led to "nil results observed" and the failure of all 19 intelligence photographs taken by aircraft 141 M and 955 A. Despite these constraints, the formation delivered 80 bombs into the target area. The jettisoning of four "hang-ups" over the sea was a standard safety procedure to prevent landing with live, unstable ordnance. The intelligence observations in section BH are particularly noteworthy. The "two unidentified single-engined A/C seen going down out of control" suggests air combat between the fighter escort and Axis interceptors at 10:42 hrs. Furthermore, the sighting of a "big camp" with a "large number of people" at specific coordinates indicates the detection of Axis reserve concentrations or logistical hubs just behind the front lines. The report of nine aircraft "holed" by accurate flak underscores the high price of maintaining pressure on Axis forward air capabilities during the definitive breakthrough in North Africa. 75 Phase 1: Verification & Extraction Identity Check: No specific date is recorded on this aircrew manifest; however, internal cross-referencing with the corresponding Sortie Report (Part A) on folio 57 identifies the mission date as 22/10/42. Phase 2: Technical Expansion (The "Transcriber's Notes") Glossary of Terms: * A/C: Aircraft. In this context, the Martin Baltimore light bombers operated by No. 21 Squadron SAAF. * Capt. / Lt. / Maj.: Military rank designations for Captain, Lieutenant, and Major respectively. * A/Sgt. / F/Sgt.: Non-commissioned officer ranks for Acting Sergeant and Flight Sergeant. * M, J, E, K, L, A, AA, G, V, N, Z, S, X, T: Individual aircraft identification letters used by the squadron to distinguish between different airframes of the same type. Operational Context: This aircrew manifest, archived as folio 58, provides the comprehensive list of the fourteen crews of No. 21 Squadron SAAF assigned to the medium-level bombing attack on Landing Ground (L.G.) 20 on 22 October 1942. Strategically, this mission represented a significant tactical effort by the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) during the final twenty-four hours preceding the launch of the Second Battle of El Alamein. The target, L.G. 20, was a critical Axis forward landing ground in the El Daba sector. The primary objective of such raids was airfield neutralization—destroying the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica on the ground to achieve total Allied air superiority for the 8th Army's ground offensive. The manifest confirms the mission was led by Major Coppen in A/C 940 "V," illustrating the requirement for senior leadership during high-stakes interdiction raids against heavily defended Axis airfields. The standard four-man crew structure—Pilot, Observer, and two Gunners—is maintained across the formation, reflecting the Baltimore's requirements for navigation and defense during "shuttle bombing" sorties. Despite the successful delivery of eighty 250lb G.P. bombs, heavy cloud cover over the target prevented the observers listed here from confirming tactical results. Furthermore, the ground echelon of the squadron noted that nine aircraft were "holed" by accurate anti-aircraft fire, illustrating the substantial resistance encountered by these crews in the hours before the definitive breakthrough in North Africa. This document remains the primary personnel record for the squadron's final large-scale preparatory strike of the Alamein campaign. 76 Phase 1: Verification & Extraction Identity Check: 24 Oct. 42.