Sortie Report (Form 541)
- Duty
- Medium level bombing attack on L.G. 20 Time. Height. Place
Transcriber's Notes
- Maj. Coppen
- Major Coppen, the designated formation leader for the flight.
- L.G. 20
- Landing Ground 20, the primary Axis airfield targeted for neutralization.
- L.G. 20
- Landing Ground 20. A forward Axis airfield located in the El Daba sector of Egypt.
- H.Q. R.A.F. M.E
- Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East. Operational Context: This Sortie Report (Part A) documents a major tactical effort on 22 October 1942, occurring during the final 24 hours of the Allied air preparation for the Second Battle of El Alamein. Strategically, the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) focused heavily on airfield suppression in the El Daba sector to ground Axis air power before the 8th Army's offensive. The narrative details a sophisticated flight path designed to mitigate Axis detection and ground fire. The formation used the "road and railway line" at Ras-el-Daba as a navigational fix for its run-in to the target, subsequently exiting "due North to sea" before returning to L.G. 98. This maritime egress was a standard tactical maneuver used to evade Axis interceptors and heavy anti-aircraft concentrations inland. The report notes significant weather impediments, with "9/10" cloud cover over the target area and "bad" visibility. This heavy cloud layer explains the "nil results observed" noted in the corresponding Intelligence Postagram (OPREP 99) despite the delivery of eighty 250lb G.P. bombs. Led by Major Coppen, this joint-squadron effort utilized the combined strength of fourteen Martin Baltimores and four Douglas Bostons to ensure maximum saturation of Landing Ground 20. This document, archived as Folio 57, represents the final large-scale light bomber strike of the pre-offensive phase, illustrating the persistence of Allied operations even in marginal weather conditions during the definitive breakthrough in Egypt. 74
- 250 G.P
- 250-pound General Purpose high-explosive bombs.
- A/C
- Aircraft. Specifically, the Martin Baltimore light bombers of No. 21 Squadron SAAF.
- A/C
- Aircraft. In this context, the Martin Baltimore light bombers operated by No. 21 Squadron SAAF.
R.A.F. Form 441 A.: Royal Air Force Sortie Report form used for documenting the primary narrative and technical details of individual combat missions.
Oprep. Ref. No. 99: Operational Report reference number 99.
9300: Ninety-three hundred feet, the release altitude for the medium-level bombing run.
ft.: Feet, the unit of measurement for the release altitude of 9,000 feet.
43 detonator with rods: Refers to the No. 43 tail pistol/detonator used with "daisy cutter" extension rods on the nose. These rods triggered the bomb above ground level to maximize lateral fragmentation damage against soft targets like parked aircraft.
hang-ups: Ordnance that failed to release from the aircraft's bomb shackles during the primary attack.
p.p.: Point position, referring to specific map grid coordinates used for intelligence reporting. Operational Context: This Sortie Report (Part B) details the results of Oprep 99, a medium-level strike on Landing Ground 20 conducted on 22 October 1942. Strategically, this raid took place during the final 24 hours preceding the launch of the Second Battle of El Alamein (23 October 1942). The Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) intensified these airfield suppression missions to neutralize the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica on the ground, ensuring Allied air superiority for the 8th Army's ground offensive. The mission faced significant environmental challenges, as "bad visibility" and heavy cloud cover led to "nil results observed" and the failure of all 19 intelligence photographs taken by aircraft 141 M and 955 A. Despite these constraints, the formation delivered 80 bombs into the target area. The jettisoning of four "hang-ups" over the sea was a standard safety procedure to prevent landing with live, unstable ordnance. The intelligence observations in section BH are particularly noteworthy. The "two unidentified single-engined A/C seen going down out of control" suggests air combat between the fighter escort and Axis interceptors at 10:42 hrs. Furthermore, the sighting of a "big camp" with a "large number of people" at specific coordinates indicates the detection of Axis reserve concentrations or logistical hubs just behind the front lines. The report of nine aircraft "holed" by accurate flak underscores the high price of maintaining pressure on Axis forward air capabilities during the definitive breakthrough in North Africa. 75