Operation

TO : H.Q. MAAF (attention 23rd SCORU) H.Q. NATAF (attention 2nd Command Unit 23rd SCORU) SAOA SAAF FROM : SIO 21 SQUADRON SAAF REF : 21S/602 DATE : 25th March 1944 OPREP No.602 for period ending 2100 hrs on 24/3/44 REF MAP ITALY 1:100,000 Sheet 146 SULMONA 13 Baltimores (One returned after 15 Mins owing to engine trouble) took off from BIFERNO L/G at 1200 Hrs to bomb SULMONA M/Yds 092842. After R/V with 223 Sqdn (Leading) they flew to CASOLI and on to targetafter making a wide circle to xxxx keep clear of 223 Sqdn. who made a dummy run before bombing. Attack took place at 1257 Hrs from 11500' on a course of 320° Boxes bombed independently. Second box slightly to the right of the 1st box. Lateral error to the right of the 500/600 yds occurred in both cases. 1st box from 0932839 to 0928847. 2nd box from 0932835 to 0930845 - 1 direct hit on Rd 0935836. NO other results observed. NO enemy opposition. All a/c landed back to base by 1342 Hrs. Weather over target was clear with 4/10 to 6/10 high cloud at 18000/20000' - 4 Spitfires gave area cover B: (1) 3 Balts Mk.IIIA. (ii) NIL (1) 8 Balts Mk.IV. (ii) NIL (1) 2 Balts Mk.V (ii) NIL C: NIL D: (1) 4.45 Hrs (ii) NIL (1) 12.20 Hrs (ii) NIL (1) 3.10 Hrs (ii) NIL E: (1) 9600 x .30 900 x .303 2100 x .50 (ii) & (iii) NIL (1) 25600 x .30 2400 x .303 5600 x .50 (ii) & (iii) NIL (1) 6400 x .30 600 x .303 1400 x .50 (ii) & (iii) NIL F: (1) 6 x 500 MC 9 x 250 GP (ii) As in (1) (iii) & (iv) NIL (1) 16 x 500 MC 24 x 250 GP (ii) 14 x 500 MC 21 x 250 GP (iii) & (iv) NIL (1) 4 x 500 MC 6 x 250 GP (ii) As in (1) (iii) & (iv) NIL Fused: 47 Det 27 Pist (Nose) 49 Det 28 Pist (Tail) G to Z: NIL Wahlin...? Capt SIO 21 Squadron, S.A.A.F.

1944-03-25

__o_O_o__

Form 541

MAP

Transcriber's Notes

Transcriber's Historical & Tactical Notes: * Targeting Logistics (Sulmona): * The Objective: The target was the Sulmona Marshalling Yards (M/Yds). Sulmona is a critical rail junction in the mountainous Abruzzo region, serving as a gateway between the Adriatic coast and Rome. Severing this line would further isolate German forces on both sides of the peninsula. * The Approach: The formation rendezvoused with 223 Squadron (RAF) and flew via Casoli. Casoli sits on the edge of the Majella mountain range; using it as a waypoint kept the bombers over allied-controlled or partisan-heavy territory until the final run-in. * Tactical Coordination & Errors: * Avoiding Collision: The report notes a specific maneuver: "making a wide circle to keep clear of 223 Sqdn. who made a dummy run before bombing". This illustrates the complexity of multi-squadron raids. If the lead squadron aborted its first run (dummy run) to check aim or wind, the following squadron (21 SAAF) had to orbit violently to avoid running up the tail of the leaders or dropping bombs through their formation. * Inaccuracy: Despite the clear weather ("4/10 to 6/10 high cloud"), the bombing was poor. A "Lateral error to the right of 500/600 yds occurred in both cases". A miss of half a kilometer meant the main rail yards were likely spared, though they claimed "1 direct hit on Rd (Road)." * Operational Details: * Engine Trouble: One aircraft was forced to return "after 15 Mins owing to engine trouble". This reduced the strike force from 13 to 12. * No Opposition: "NO enemy opposition" was encountered. By late March 1944, German flak resources were increasingly concentrated around major hubs like Rome and Cassino, leaving some secondary targets exposed. * Abbreviations: * M/Yds: Marshalling Yards. * R/V: Rendezvous. * L/G: Landing Ground. * Rd: Road. * SCORU: Scientific Operational Research Unit. 64 Verification: Target File Verification: The document is dated 25th Mar 1944 in the "DATE" field. It is a Sortie Report (No. 603) detailing a mission flown on March 24th, 1944.