No enemy opposition. Weather: Target clear, but visibility

APPENDIX "N" 322 TO : H.Q. MAAF (attention 23rd SCORU) H.Q. NATAF (attention 2nd Command Unit 23rd SCORU) SAOA SAAF FROM : SIO 21 SQUADRON SAAF REF : 21S/714 DATE : 10th June, 1944 OPREP No. 714 for the period ending 1300 hrs on the 10th June, 1944 REF MAP : ITALY 1:100,000 SHEET 117 IESI 12 Baltimores airborne from BIFERNO at 1005 hrs to attack CHIARAVALLE R.R. BRIDGE at S462456. After picking up an escort of 6 Spitfires at PENNA POINT, formation set course at 1033 and bombed at 1110 hrs from 11500' on a course of 040°. Vics bombed line astern and pattern of whole formation resulted in an overshoot into open fields N.E. of target. No enemy opposition. Weather: Target clear, but visibility hazy. All A/c down by 1215 hrs. B: (i) 6 Balts IV (ii) NIL (i) 6 Balts V (ii) NIL C: (i) & (ii) NIL (i) & (ii) NIL D: (i) 13.00 Hrs (ii) NIL (i) 13.00 Hrs (ii) NIL E: (i) 19200 x .30 1800 x .303 4200 x .50 (ii) & (iii) NIL (i) 19200 x .30 1800 x .303 4200 x .50 (ii) & (iii) NIL F: (i) 24 x 500 M.C. (ii) As above (iii) & (iv) NIL (i) 24 x 500 M.C. (ii) As above (iii) & (iv) NIL 45 x 500 fused : 49 - 27 Nose , 36 - 28 Tail 3 x 500 fused : 52 - 37 Tail (6 - 12 Hr delay) to Z: NIL S.L. Boshoff Lt. S.I.O., 21 Squadron, SAAF. FL Lt Col Jandrell D.F.C

1944-06-10

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Form 541

MAP

Transcriber's Notes

Transcriber's Historical & Tactical Notes: * A Failed Follow-Up (Chiaravalle): * Context: This raid was a follow-up to the successful strike on the same target (Chiaravalle Railway Bridge) the previous day (see Sortie 713, File 31). On June 9th, the squadron achieved a "perfect straddle." * The Result: In stark contrast, this mission on June 10th was a complete failure. The report bluntly states the "pattern of whole formation resulted in an overshoot into open fields N.E. of target.". * The Cause: The report mentions "Vics bombed line astern." This refers to the formation shape (V-shaped clusters of three aircraft). Bombing "line astern" (one Vic behind the other) usually allowed for correction, but in this case, the entire formation missed long. The "hazy" visibility likely contributed to the error, making the target difficult to acquire in the bomb sights until too late. * Operational Tempo: * Morning Raid: The aircraft were airborne by 10:05 hrs and back by 12:15 hrs. This rapid turnaround suggests the squadron was pushing hard to maintain pressure on the Ancona rail lines. * Ordnance Adjustment: Interestingly, the load of delay-fused bombs was reduced significantly compared to previous days. Only "3 x 500 fused... (6 - 12 Hr delay)" were carried, with the vast majority (45 bombs) being standard impact fuses. This might suggest a shortage of delay fuses or a tactical decision to prioritize immediate destruction over area denial, given they missed the bridge the previous day. * Leadership: * Lt. Col. Jandrell: The mission was personally led by the Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. Jandrell D.F.C. (signed as FL - Flight Leader). It is a reminder that even the most experienced commanders could lead missions that resulted in misses; level bombing was an inherently imprecise art. * Lt. Boshoff: The report is signed by Lt. S.L. Boshoff, acting as S.I.O. (Squadron Intelligence Officer) in place of Capt. Hallick. * Abbreviations: * R.R.: Railroad. * N.E.: North East. * M.C.: Medium Capacity (High Explosive). * S.I.O.: Squadron Intelligence Officer. * A/c: Aircraft. 34 Verification: Target File Verification: The document is dated 11th June, 1944 in the "DATE" field. It is a Sortie Report (No. 715) labeled APPENDIX "O" (page number 323).