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APPENDIX "R" 328 TO : H.Q. MAAF (attention 23rd SCORU) H.Q. NATAF (attention 2nd Command Unit 23rd SCORU) SAOA SAAF FROM : SIO 21 SQUADRON SAAF REF : 21S/720 DATE : 14th June, 1944 OPREP No. 720 for the period ending 1200 hrs on the 14th June, 1944 REF MAP : ITALY 1:100,000 SHEET 110 SENIGALLIA 12 Baltimores off from BIFERNO at 0838 to attack a RAILWAY BRIDGE near FANO at S240715. With a close escort of 6 Spitfires, formation set course from PENNA POINT at 0905 and bombed on box leaders at 0950 from 12500' on a course of 270°. First box undershot, pattern finishing just short of the bridge. Second box straddled western end, with possible D/H's on approaches and 3 - 4 hits on railway line. No enemy opposition. Weather: Clear en route and over target. All A/c down by 1115 hrs. B: (i) 6 Balts IV (ii) NIL (i) 6 Balts V (ii) NIL C: NIL D: (i) 16.00 Hrs (ii) NIL (i) 16.00 Hrs (ii) NIL E: (i) 19200 x .30 1800 x .303 4200 x .50 (ii) & (iii) NIL (i) 19200 x .30 1800 x .303 4200 x .50 (ii) & (iii) NIL F: (i) 24 x 500 M.C. (ii) As above (iii) & (iv) NIL 45 fused: 36 - 28 Tail 3 fused: 52 - 37 Tail (delay) (i) 24 x 500 M.C. (ii) As above (iii) & (iv) NIL to Z: NIL Hallick Capt. S.I.O., 21 Squadron, SAAF. FL Major de Wet

1944-06-14

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Form 541

MAP

Transcriber's Notes

Transcriber's Historical & Tactical Notes: * Return to Fano (Correction of Error): * Strategic Persistence: The squadron returned to the "RAILWAY BRIDGE near FANO at S240715". This is the same target they completely missed ("undershot into river bed") on June 11th (see File 34). * Improved Results: While the first box undershot again ("finishing just short of the bridge"), the second box corrected the error. They achieved a "straddle" on the western end with "3 - 4 hits on railway line." This successfully cut the line, fulfilling the strategic objective even if the bridge span itself wasn't dropped. * Tactics (Box Bombing): * "Bombed on Box Leaders": The report specifies they "bombed on box leaders." This means individual bombardiers did not sight the target themselves; instead, they watched the lead aircraft in their formation (box). When the leader dropped his bombs, everyone else toggled their release instantly. This tactic concentrated the bomb pattern (the "stick") to maximize the chance of a hit, but it placed immense pressure on the lead bombardier—if he missed, everyone missed (as seen with the first box's undershoot). * Ordnance (The "Tail Only" Fuse): * Unusual Fusing: Section F notes "45 fused: 36 - 28 Tail" (with no Nose fuse listed). Standard fusing usually involved both nose and tail fuses (e.g., "49-27 Nose, 36-28 Tail"). Using only a tail fuse might suggest a desire for a very short delay to allow the bomb to penetrate slightly before exploding, or simply a shortage of nose fuses at the base. * Delay Bombs: Once again, "3 fused... (delay)" were included to hamper repair efforts. * Leadership: * Major de Wet: The mission was led by Major de Wet (Flight Leader). After the disastrous "hang-up" accident involving the Commanding Officer (Lt. Col. Jandrell) the previous day (File 38), having the reliable Major de Wet lead a successful strike was likely crucial for stabilizing squadron nerves. * Abbreviations: * D/H's: Direct Hits. * S.I.O.: Squadron Intelligence Officer. * M.C.: Medium Capacity (High Explosive). * A/c: Aircraft. 40 Verification: Target File Verification: The document is dated 14th June, 1944 in the "Date" field. It is a Sortie Report (No. 721) labeled APPENDIX "S" (page number 329).