GZINA.

R.A.F. Form 441 A. SORTIE REPORT "T" (Part A.) 28

No. One Oprep. Ref. No. 166 Date. 14 JAN 43 Squadron. 21 SAAF. Type of Aircraft. 10 Baltimores Captain Leader of formation Aircraft No. (with 6 Bostons of 24 Sqn) Crew. Lt/Col. Coppen Aircraft Letter. See attached list. Lt. Farrant. " Up. 1438 Down. 1633 Aerodrome or L.G. GZINA. Time. 19 hrs. 50 mins. Type of Cloud. None Map or Chart Amount of Cloud. " Reference. Base of Cloud. - LIBYA 1 : 500,000 Visibility. Haze over route. 3 M. Sheets 3/9 MISURATA. General Weather. Hazy. Task or Duty. Bomb MT concentration at W 9090. Height. Place. Narrative. GZINA Formation airborne.

3000 " S/C for HAMRAT NORTH (57 Group) 3000 HAMRAT Circled until 1530 hrs. 3000 " Fighters started to take off. 4000 " S/C 275 deg. 4500 Fighters started to indicate some form of signal. X 5400 RX6242 Returned on course of 093 deg. 4000 HAMRAT Left fighters at HAMRAT NORTH. 4000 HAMRAT S/C for base. GZINA Landed. X Note: Close cover started to dive one at a time in front of leader, waggled wings violently and turned off to the left (Four fighters) Then top cover turned away and left formation. One fighter fired his guns in front of formation and turned for home. Medium cover turned away one by one. At this stage formation leader decided to return to base. Three fighters were still with formation. No W/T or R/T instructions were received by bomber leader.

(Handwritten Signature: [Illegible]) S I O

PART B (on reverse) to be completed according to relevant pro-forma in H.Q. R.A.F. M.E. Instruction 34. PMEJ - 200.000 - 3/42 P.T.O.

1943-01-14 GZINA.

R.A.F. Form 441 A. SORTIE REPORT "T" (Part A.) 28 No. One Oprep. Ref. No. 166 Date. 14 JAN 43 Squadron. 21 SAAF. Type of Aircraft. 10 Baltimores Captain Leader of formation Aircraft No. (with 6 Bostons of 24 Sqn) Crew. Lt/Col. Coppen Aircraft Letter. See at…

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Form 541

MAP

Transcriber's Notes

Phase 2: Technical Expansion (The "Transcriber's Notes") Glossary of Terms: * R.A.F. Form 441 A.: Royal Air Force Form 441 A, the standardized document used for recording individual sortie narratives and technical flight data. * Oprep. Ref. No. 166: Operational Report Reference Number 166, corresponding to the squadron’s third mission sequence for 14 January 1943. * 21 SAAF: No. 21 Squadron of the South African Air Force. * Baltimores: Martin Baltimore twin-engine light bombers. * Bostons / 24 Sqn: Douglas Boston Mark III light bombers from No. 24 Squadron S.A.A.F., a sister unit within No. 3 S.A.A.F. Wing. * L.G. / GZINA: Landing Ground. Gzina was a forward airfield in Tripolitania used by the Wing during the advance toward Tripoli. * MT: Mechanical Transport. Refers to Axis supply and troop vehicle concentrations. * S/C: Set Course. * 57 Group: The 57th Fighter Group of the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF), providing P-40 Warhawk/Kittyhawk escort. * deg.: Degrees magnetic heading. * W/T or R/T: Wireless Telegraphy (Morse) or Radio Telephony (Voice) communications. * S I O: Senior Intelligence Officer. Operational Context: This Sortie Report (Part A) documents an aborted mission on the afternoon of 14 January 1943, intended to strike Axis Mechanical Transport (MT) concentrations at grid W 9090. Strategically, this period represents a peak in the "fully offensive" air campaign aimed at shattering Axis logistics ahead of the Eighth Army's final push through the Wadi Zem Zem sector toward Tripoli. The tactical failure of this mission resulted from a breakdown in air-to-air communication and coordination with the USAAF 57th Group fighter escort. While a joint formation of 10 Baltimores and 6 Bostons successfully rendezvoused at Hamrat North, the escorting fighters began performing erratic non-verbal signals shortly after setting course for the target. The "X Note" detailed by the Senior Intelligence Officer describes fighters waggling wings violently, diving in front of the leader, and firing guns as a signal to turn back. The decision by Lt/Col. Coppen to abort at RX6242 was driven by the departure of the close, top, and medium cover, leaving the bombers vulnerable without fighter protection. The total lack of W/T or R/T instructions reflects the chaotic operational environment and signal interference common during rapid westward advances. This document, archived as Folio 28, highlights the inherent risks of joint-force operations when technical communication systems failed, forcing leaders to rely on visual cues and defensive doctrine to preserve airframe and crew assets. 31 Phase 1: Verification & Extraction Identity Check: 14th day of January, 1943.