Near miss on flying boat in the bay and on harbour buildings. Fairly accurate, moderate to intense HAA from headland and

To : SCOR OFFICER AHQ MALTA. HQ RAF ME. (ops records) HQ. NAAF (attention 23rd SCORU) N.A.T.A.F. (attention 2nd Command Unit 23rd SCORU) SIO. TBF. From : SIO. 21 SQUADRON ADV SAAF. Ref : 21 Sqdn/354 OPREP NO. 354 for period ending 1800 hrs 27 JULY 43. REF MAP SICILIA 1:500,000 NE 36/12. A. Eleven Baltimores took off at 1555 hrs LT and attacked MILAZZO RAILWAY STATION at 1721 hrs LT from 13500 ft on a course 345°. Bombs burst in the target area and buildings were hit starting one large fire. Smoke seen 45 miles after leaving target. Near miss on flying boat in the bay and on harbour buildings. Fairly accurate, moderate to intense HAA from headland and EAST of station. Visibility 10 miles. Weather good. B. 11 Baltimores (6 MK 3A and 5 MK 3) C. NIL. D. 29 hrs 20 mins. E. (i) 6 MK 3A: 19200 x .30, 4200 x .5, 1800 x .303. 5 MK 3 : 16000 x .30, 11500 x .303. (ii)(iii) NIL. F. (i) 6 MK 3A: 36 x 250 GP 47 Det 27 Pistol Nose fused. 5 MK 3 : 30 x 250 GP 47 Det 27 Pistol Nose fused. (ii) as in (i) (iii)(iv) NIL. G. (i)(ii) NIL (iii) FA 181 (Mk.3) Cat I by HAA. H to Z NIL. (Signature: J. S. Bester) Capt. SIO. 21 SQUADRON. SAAF.

1943-07-27

__o_O_o__

Form 541

MAP

Transcriber's Notes

TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES Abbreviations and Technical Terms Expanded * SCOR Officer: Section Control and Operational Research Officer. * AHQ: Air Headquarters. * RAF ME (ops records): Royal Air Force Middle East (Operations Records). * NAAF: Northwest African Air Forces. * SCORU: Section Control and Operational Research Unit. * N.A.T.A.F.: Northwest African Tactical Air Force. * SIO: Squadron Intelligence Officer. * TBF: Tactical Bomber Force. * ADV: Advanced (Headquarters). * SAAF: South African Air Force. * OPREP: Operational Report. * hrs LT: hours Local Time. * ft: feet. * HAA: Heavy Anti-Aircraft artillery. * MK: Mark (referring to aircraft version). * GP: General Purpose (bombs). * Det: Detonator. * Cat I: Category I (Aircraft damage that is minor and repairable within the unit). Personnel and Operational Observations * Captain J. S. Bester: Signed as the Squadron Intelligence Officer. This report covers the second of two massed daylight raids on Milazzo on July 27, 1943. * Combat Attrition: While 12 aircraft participated in the morning strike, only 11 were available for this afternoon mission. This was a direct consequence of the heavy flak damage sustained during OPREP 353, which saw several aircraft damaged and one forced into a belly-landing. * Aircraft FA 181 (Mk.3): Noted as sustaining Category I damage during this second run. This aircraft was piloted by the Simpson and Harle crew, who had also flown the morning raid in the same machine. Location and Historical Reality * Milazzo (Millazzo) Railway Station, Sicily: A vital logistical bottleneck on the northern coast. By late July 1943, the railway through Milazzo was a primary artery for German forces retreating from the "Etna Line" toward the Messina straits. * The "Precision" and the Fire: The report claims "buildings were hit starting one large fire" and smoke was visible for 45 miles. While vivid, such descriptions were common in WWII debriefings to convey mission success; however, at 13,500 feet, the specific "buildings" hit were likely part of a general area saturation of the rail yards rather than targeted structural destruction. * Near Misses and Sea Power: The sighting of a "near miss on flying boat in the bay" reflects the presence of Luftwaffe or Italian air-sea rescue and transport assets (such as the Cant Z.506) still operating in the harbor despite Allied air dominance. Historical Context (Operation HUSKY) * July 27, 1943 (D+17): This mission took place at a critical juncture. Following the fall of Palermo, the Axis high command began the systematic evacuation of heavy equipment from central Sicily. The intense "moderate to intense HAA" encountered by 21 Squadron from the headland and station area confirms that the Axis forces were heavily prioritizing the defense of their northern evacuation route. * The Martin Baltimore: The formation utilized a mix of 6 Mk 3A and 5 Mk 3 Baltimores. The use of nose-fusing (Section F) remained the standard tactical choice for these harbor and rail strikes. It ensured the 250 lb GP bombs detonated on the surface of tracks and buildings to maximize fragmentation damage to rolling stock and logistical sheds rather than penetrating into the ground. 116 The date written in the 'Date' column of target file 276-1__116.jpg is 27 Jul 43.