Operation

APPENDIX "JJ" 353 TO : H.Q. MAAF (attention 23rd SCORU) H.Q. NATAF (attention 2nd Command Unit 23rd SCORU) SAOA SAAF FROM : SIO 21 SQUADRON SAAF REF : 21S/738 DATE : 28th June, 1944 OPREP No. 738 for the period ending 2100 hrs on the 27th June, 1944 REF MAP : ITALY 1:100,000 SHEET 125 FERMO 9 Baltimores off by 1815 to attack a GUN POSITION near the bomb line at S657104. One A/c returned after 50 minutes with intercom. trouble after jettisoning bombs in sea at C723930. In two boxes of four, formation set course at 1837 and bombed at 1905 from 12000' on a course of 340°. First box failed to identify target and bombed at S525080, straddling a railway line. Second box bombed briefed target, resulting in slight overshoot. Pattern commenced in target area and ran on beyond, with D/Hits on nearby road. Weather: en route and target clear, visibility hazy. Fighter area cover provided. No enemy opposition. All A/c down by 1940 hrs. B: (i) 4 Balts IV (ii) NIL (i) 5 Balts V (ii) NIL C: NIL D: (i) 5.05 Hrs (ii) NIL (i) 7.05 Hrs (ii) NIL E: (i) 12800 x .30 1200 x .303 2800 x .50 (ii) & (iii) NIL (i) 16000 x .30 1500 x .303 3500 x .50 (ii) & (iii) NIL F: (i) 8 x 500 M.C. 12 x 250 G.P (ii) 6 x 500 8 x 250 (iii) 2 x 500 3 x 250 (iv) NIL (Fused: 52 - 44 Nose, 36 - 28 Tail) (i) 10 x 500 M.C. 15 x 250 G.P. (ii) 10 x 500 14 x 250 (iii) 1 x 250 (iv) NIL G to V: NIL W: (i) 3 Marauders III (ii) NIL X: (i) 3.25 Hrs (ii) NIL Y & Z: NIL S.L. Boshoff W. Capt. S.I.O., 21 Squadron, SAAF. FL Lt Col Jandrell D.F.C.

1944-06-28

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Form 541

MAP

Transcriber's Notes

Transcriber's Historical & Tactical Notes: * Tactical Shift (Close Air Support): * The Target: Instead of the usual interdiction targets (bridges/rails), this mission was briefed to attack a "GUN POSITION near the bomb line at S657104.". This signifies a shift to Close Air Support (CAS), directly aiding ground troops by suppressing enemy artillery. * "The Bomb Line": The reference to the "bomb line" is critical. This was a designated geographic line on the map; anything beyond it (enemy side) was open for attack, while anything behind it (Allied side) was strictly forbidden to protect friendly troops. Bombing "near the bomb line" required extreme precision to avoid "blue-on-blue" incidents. * Execution Failure: The report highlights the difficulty of identifying camouflaged tactical targets from 12,000 feet. The "First box failed to identify target and bombed at S525080," effectively missing the gun position entirely and hitting a railway line miles away instead. The second box managed a "slight overshoot" on the correct target. * Equipment Failure (Intercom): * Jettison Procedure: One aircraft aborted due to "intercom trouble," jettisoning its bombs "in sea at C723930" before returning. This safety protocol ensured the aircraft landed light, minimizing fire risk if the landing gear failed, and prevented accidental release over friendly territory. * Non-Operational Activity: * The Marauders: The "3 Marauders III" listed in previous reports (File 60) are still present, logging "3.25 Hrs" of flight time. This likely represents their return flight to their home base after assisting with the move to Pescara, or a long-range ferry mission. * Leadership: * Lt. Col. Jandrell: The mission was led by Lt. Col. Jandrell D.F.C. (Flight Leader). Once again, the C.O. experienced a difficult mission, with half his formation missing the target entirely. * S.I.O. Signature: The report is signed by "S.L. Boshoff W., Capt.". It appears Boshoff has been promoted or officially confirmed in the role, as previous entries listed him as "Lt for Capt." The "W" likely refers to his middle initial or a specific qualification. * Abbreviations: * A/c: Aircraft. * M.C.: Medium Capacity (High Explosive). * G.P.: General Purpose. * D/Hits: Direct Hits. * S.I.O.: Squadron Intelligence Officer. 65 Verification: Target File Verification: The document is Appendix "KK" to the War Diary, specifically Squadron Routine Orders No. 61/44. The document is dated 28th June, 1944 under the signature block of the Officer Commanding.