BEN HAGEN LG.

SORTIE REPORT (Part A.) R.A.F. Form 441 A. 39 Sheet No. 1 Oprep. Ref. No. 333 Date. 10/11 JUL 43 Squadron. 21 SAAF Type of Aircraft. 3 Mk III & 1 Mk IIIA BALTIMORES. Aircraft No. ) Aircraft Letter. ) see Back. Captain Lt.Col. Coppen. Capt. Farrant. Crew. Other aircraft followed same course in main. Time Up. 2116 hrs LT. Time Down. 2359 hrs LT. Total Time. 9 hrs 50 mins. Aerodrome or L.G. BEN HAGEN LG. Type of Cloud. Cumulus. Amount of Cloud. 7/10 C.BON area. NIL over target. Base of Cloud. Top 3000’ Visibility. 5 miles over target, 10 miles local coast. General Weather. Good – slight haze. Map or Chart Reference. SICILIA. 1:500,000 NE 36/12. Task or Duty. MEDIUM LEVEL BOMBING ATTACK SCIACCA LG. | Time | Height | Place | Narrative | |---|---|---|---| | 2116 | | Ben Hagen | Airborne. | | | | | Set course for RAS FORTASS 050°Mag. | | 2123 | 3000 | Ras Fortass | Set course for KELIBIA 104°Mag. | | 2132 | 4500 | Kelibia | Followed coast to HAMMET and back to KELIBIA. | | 2145 | 9000 | GRANITOLA | Set course for GRANITOLA. Followed course to C.S.MARCO at 9000’ | | 2227 | 9000 | C.S.Marco | Turned onto target 010°Mag. | | | 9000 | | Bombing. Course 310°Mag. Dropped 3 flares. | | | | | First 3 flares lighted. | | | | | Right hand turn off target – climbing. | | 2238 | 10000 | | Dropped last 2 flares – course 320°Mag. | | | | | Flares alight. Set course for KELIBIA 255°Mag. | | 2315 | 4000 | Kelibia | Set course for BEN HAGEN 284°Mag. | | 2359 | | Ben Hagen | Landed. | | | | | Last aircraft landed. | (Signature: G.W. Thompson) Lt. for Capt. SIO. 21 SQUADRON. SAAF.

1943-07-11 BEN HAGEN LG.

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Form 541

MAP

Transcriber's Notes

TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES * Abbreviations and Technical Terms Expanded: * LT: Local Time. * LG: Landing Ground. * Mag / °Mag: Magnetic (referring to compass heading). * GP: General Purpose (referring to the bomb type listed in the associated OPREP). * C.BON: Cape Bon. * C.S.MARCO: Capo San Marco. * Route and Navigational Analysis: * Deceptive Dogleg: After reaching Kelibia at 2132 hrs, the formation performed a "dogleg" maneuver, following the coast to Hammet (Hammamet) and back before heading to Sicily. This tactic was often used to confuse Axis radar regarding the aircraft's final destination. * Approach Profile: The crew maintained a steady 9,000 ft altitude from Granitola to Capo San Marco. The final run-in to the Sciacca LG was executed on a sharp 010° Mag heading. * Departure: The aircraft performed a climbing right-hand turn off the target, reaching 10,000 ft before setting a return course of 255° Mag toward Tunisia. * Ordnance and Tactical Observations: * Bomb Load: Per the associated OPREP 333, the formation carried 24 x 250 lb GP bombs (.025 Tail fused) and 30 x 4 lb incendiaries. * Illumination Strategy: The lead aircraft acted as a pathfinder, dropping 3 flares on the initial bombing course (310° Mag) and 2 additional flares during the turn-off (320° Mag) to mark the target for following aircraft. * Strike Observations: The OPREP notes "Most bombs seen to explode". A notable "brilliant white explosion flash" was observed following one bomb hit, which faded and then "revived" before dying out, suggesting a secondary fire or hit on fuel/ordnance. * Enemy Defenses: Resistance was light, with only "isolated flashes" of inaccurate Light Anti-Aircraft (LAA) fire reported from Capo San Marco. * Historical and Location Context: * Sciacca LG: This was a critical Axis "satellite" airfield in southwestern Sicily. By July 10/11, the Allied invasion (Operation HUSKY) was underway; strikes here were vital to preventing Axis aircraft from harassing the landing beaches. * Modern Names: Granitola is known today as Torretta Granitola (Province of Trapani). Capo San Marco remains a prominent coastal landmark near the modern city of Sciacca. * Weather Impact: Heavy 7/10 cloud cover was reported over the Cap Bon area, but the target itself remained clear with only a slight haze, providing a 5-mile visibility range for the bomb aimers. In World War II operational documents, such as those from 21 Squadron SAAF, time was almost exclusively recorded as Local Time (LT) to ensure coordination with ground movements and sunset/sunrise. This was used in opposition to Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), often referred to by the British as "Zulu" or "Universal" time. Local Time (LT) vs. Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) * Operational Coordination: Local Time was used for tactical strikes to sync with specific environmental conditions, such as "0315 hrs LT" for pre-dawn takeoffs to avoid daytime interceptors. * Standardization: GMT (Zulu) was used for high-level strategic communication between different theaters (e.g., between London and North Africa) to prevent confusion when crossing multiple time zones. * Double Summer Time: To maximize daylight for factory production and military operations, the UK used British Double Summer Time (BDST), which was GMT+2. Time Zones in the Mediterranean Theatre (1943) During the Sicilian campaign (Operation HUSKY) in July 1943, the time zones were structured as follows: | Region | Time Zone Name | Offset from GMT | |---|---|---| | Tunisia (Base) | Central European Time (CET) | GMT +1 | | Sicily (Target) | Central European Time (CET) | GMT +1 | | United Kingdom | British Double Summer Time | GMT +2 | Because the squadron was flying from Ben Hagen, Tunisia, to targets in Sicily, the aircrews remained within the same local time zone (GMT+1), which simplified navigation and fuel calculations for long sorties, such as the 5-hour and 45-minute flight to Sciacca. Navigational Observations and Time The use of LT was critical for Pathfinder operations, where precise timing was needed to drop flares that would only stay alight for "2 to 3 minutes". * Time of Origin (TOO): Reports included a "TOO" (e.g., TOO 1800 hrs LT) to mark exactly when the intelligence summary was filed after the aircraft had landed and the crews were debriefed. * ETA (Estimated Time of Arrival): When visibility was "bad" or there was "dense haze," crews relied on their chronometers to bomb on a calculated ETA rather than visual confirmation. * Night Operations: The shift to night strikes meant takeoffs occurred in total darkness (e.g., 2116 hrs LT) with landings often occurring at sunrise (0610 hrs LT), necessitating accurate local timekeeping to find the desert "flare path" back at base. 52 The date written in the 'Date' line of the postagram is 11 JUL 43.