Sortie — Thursday, 15 March 1945

Sortie Report (Form 541)

Date: - 15th MARCH 1945

APPENDIX "K" C O N F I D E N T I A L . 113FROM :- S.I.O. NO. 21 SQUADRON. S.A.A.F.TO :- H.Q. M.A.A.F. ( ATTENTION OPERATIONS RECORDS.)H.Q. M.A.T.A.F.( S.C.O.R.U.)S.A.O.A. ADV. H.Q. S.A.A.F. C.M.F.W.I.O. 3 SA WING S.A.A.F.REF :- 21S/963.DATE :- 15th MARCH 1945.OPREP NO. 963 FOR THE PERIOD ENDING 2100 HOURS ON THE 14th MARCH 1945.REF. MAP ITALY 1,100,000 pp C 471889 SHEET NO. 14 (PONTEBBA).OPERATION NO. 167/21S/M.A. : 10 Marauders airborne from JESI L/G between 1245 and 1616 hoursto bomb PONTEBBA M/Y at pp C 471889. After R/V at PORTO CORSINIwith 4 Spitfires at 1344 hrs. the formation set course fortarget and bombed at 1434 hrs. from 10,000 - 11,500'. Bombsfrom first box fell with left lateral error and slight overshoot,scoring no hits in target area. The second box bombed with astick which straddled the centre of the target, 75 percent of thebombs falling on the target, and causing explosions and fires.Stick from third box started at extreme western tip of M/Y andfinished at bridge outside target, falling with slight overshoot.Hits on railway line and buildings south of the line. There wasslight inaccurate H.A.A. from GORIZIA area. General weather wasfair with some medium and high cloud. Visibility was fair inslight haze.2 Marauders airborne between 1302 and 1626 to bomb gun positionsdefending PONTEBBA flew with 2 A/C from 30 Squadron and dropped aload of fragmentation clusters at 1443 hours from 11,000'. OneA/C had undershoot and right lateral error. The other bombed 3miles south of briefed pinpoint, straddling a railway bridge atC 4758. Approx. 10 min. before bombing both 30 Squadron A/C werelost. Cause unknown, but slight collision in mid - air presumed.Tail plane seen to fall off one A/C. Total of 7 parachutescounted in TARVISIO area.B. : (1) 12 MARAUDERS 111 (ii) NIL.C. : (1) NIL. (ii) NIL.D. : (1) 40.20 HOURS. (ii) NIL.E. : (1) 40,800 x .5 (ii) NIL. (iii) NIL.F. : (1) 60 x 500lb (ii) 60 x 500lb (iii) and (iv) NIL.40 x 250 40 x 250384 x 20 (FRAG) 384 x 20 (FRAG.)396 lb's. "WINDOW"Fusing tail only 30-51(Demo.) 22 Pkts. PAMPHLETS.G. To V. NIL.W. : (1) 2 MARAUDERS 111 (ii) NIL.X. : (1) 2.55 Hours. (ii) NIL.Y. : (1) 1 x 250lb G.P. Tail fusedNIL. S.F. Wiggill [Signed] --------------------- LT. CAPTAIN. 21 SQUADRON S.A.A.F.

Handwritten Marginalia / Stamps: * Folio Number: 113 (Handwritten, Top Right). * Reference Stamp:

Transcriber's Notes

S.I.O: Squadron Intelligence Officer. Lieutenant Captain S.F. Wiggill was tasked with mission debriefing and OPREP compilation.
S.C.O.R.U: Section for Operational Research and Underlining (or Unit), responsible for analyzing strike accuracy.
C.M.F: Central Mediterranean Force.
JESI L/G: Jesi Landing Ground, Italy; the operational base for 21 Squadron in March 1945.
R/V: Rendezvous; the tactical coordination point at Porto Corsini for formation assembly with the 4 Spitfire escorts.
Spitfires: Supermarine Spitfire fighter aircraft provided for top-cover and escort.
WINDOW: Chaff; strips of aluminum foil (396 lb dispensed) used to saturate German radar-directed defenses. Operational Context Target File 271-3_24 chronicles Operation No. 167/21S/M, a 12-aircraft strike launched on March 14, 1945, against the Pontebba Marshalling Yards. By March 1945, the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) were executing Operation Bingo, a theater-wide interdiction campaign designed to achieve the total logistical paralysis of German Heeresgruppe C in Northern Italy by systematically severing all supply and escape routes through the Alpine passes. Pontebba, situated near the Tarvisio pass, was a vital strategic terminal for Axis materiel moving toward the Reich. This methodology represents the strategic maturation of interdiction principles established during the 1943 battles for the Bernhardt and Gustav Lines. In November 1943, 21 Squadron SAAF executed high-intensity strikes on localized bottlenecks, such as location H055630, to paralyze German reserves attempting to reach the front. By March 1945, the emphasis had shifted to theater-wide strategic isolation. The Pontebba raid involved complex coordination, including dedicated "Anti-Flak" aircraft dropping fragmentation clusters to suppress defenses. The report highlights the inherent risks of such large-scale formations: while 75% of the second box's bombs hit the target, two aircraft from 30 Squadron were lost in a presumed mid-air collision, with seven parachutes observed in the Tarvisio area. Despite these losses, the formation integrated kinetic destruction with non-kinetic psychological warfare (22 packets of pamphlets) and technical electronic warfare (Window) to maintain pressure on the crumbling Axis logistics network. 25 Phase 1: Verification & Extraction Identity Check: 17th MARCH 1945.