123456789101112

Operation No. 39

DISPERSED AIRCRAFT, LANDING GROUND GAZALA NO. 2

Over target: 1315 hrs Time: 13:30 hrs

Operational Report (Form 541)

Date
17.11.41
Aircraft
Nine Marylands. OBJECTIVE. High level bombing attack on dispersed aircraft, Landing Ground Gazala No. 2
Took off
1330 hrs
Map reference
Target Map G.8 and G.9 (1) Ain - El - Gazala 1:100000
21 SQUADRON OPERATIONAL REPORT NO. 39. COPY NO. 6....(Orders: 3 Wing S.A. No. "A" 311 and 21 Squadron Op. order No. 39)DATE: 17.11.41MAP REF: Target Map G.8 and G.9 (1) Ain - El - Gazala 1:100000.DATE OF OPERATION. 17th. November 1941.NUMBER AND TYPE OF AIRCRAFT. Nine Marylands.OBJECTIVE. High level bombing attack on dispersed aircraft, Landing Ground Gazala No. 2.NARRATIVE. Nine Marylands took off at 1330 hours, from base and S/C from Fuka point to a point about 20 miles North of the target. The formation found 4/10 cloud for the first hour of flight and 10/10 cloud after passing Bardia Coast. At a point about 20 miles North of the target the formation turned South to attack, but found the target area obscured by thick layers of heavy cloud. The inlet at Ain - El - Gazala was visible for a moment and also the bend in the road immediately North East of Landing Ground No. 2. The run up was made at 190 deg. The Leader's Observer aimed to drop his bombs along the Eastern boundary of the L.G. and the other Flights released at the same time. It ~~thus~~ appears after careful interrogation that three sticks fell in the area near or across the Eastern shelters. Three sticks ~~across~~ the along the Eastern boundary and the other three sticks about 100 - 150 yards inside the Eastern boundary across the L. G. It was impossible to observe bomb bursts. No enemy movement or concentration was seen on the return flight, which was made across land.WEATHER. 4/10 for first hour of flight. 10/10 over Bardia, extending along Coast for a considerable distance. Visibility improved 50 miles South East of Ain - El - Gazala.PHOTOGRAPHY. Under the circumstances no photographs were taken.TIMES. Airborne 1335 hours.Time over target 1515 hours.Landed 1710 hours.Total hours flown 33 hours.DISTRIBUTION.
S.I.O. H.Q. R.A.F. M.E.
Intelligence A.H.Q.W.D.
Operations do
3 Wing (S.A.) S.I.O.
*
War Diary
File[Signature: JS Be...] 2/Lt.For SQUADRON INTELLIGENCE OFFICER.

Transcriber's Notes

3 Wing S.A
3 Wing (South African) of the South African Air Force, the administrative and tactical formation under which 21 Squadron operated within the Desert Air Force structure.
Marylands
The Martin Maryland (Model 167), an American-built twin-engine light bomber characterized by high speed and effective defensive armament, utilized by 21 Squadron for high-altitude daylight bombing.
S/C
Set Course, specifically from the navigational waypoint at Fuka point.
A.H.Q.W.D
Air Headquarters Western Desert, the primary command unit responsible for directing air operations in support of the Eighth Army. Operational Context: The mission of 17 November 1941 marks the eve of the launch of Operation Crusader, the major Allied offensive to relieve the Siege of Tobruk and drive Axis forces out of Cyrenaica. This sortie against Gazala Landing Ground No. 2 was a vital component of the pre-offensive air phase, intended to neutralize Axis air assets on the ground. By targeting dispersed aircraft and shelters, the Desert Air Force aimed to minimize the ability of the Jagdflieger (fighter pilots) and Kampfgeschwader (bomber wings) to contest the airspace over the Eighth Army’s advance, scheduled to begin on 18 November. The narrative highlights the tactical challenges of the winter desert climate, specifically the 10/10 cloud cover (total sky obscuration) encountered over the target. The decision to bomb through momentary gaps in the cloud based on geographical features, such as the inlet at Ain-El-Gazala, reflects the high priority placed on this mission despite the lack of direct visual confirmation of results. The absence of photographic evidence and the inability to observe bursts were direct consequences of these meteorological constraints, yet the "careful interrogation" of crews suggests a concentrated bombing pattern along the eastern airfield boundary, a known location for Axis aircraft dispersals. 166 Phase 1: Verification & Extraction Identity Check: While the specific page (Sheet 152) does not contain a dedicated "Date" column, the preceding operational report (Sheet 151) confirms the date for this Appendix "A" crew list as 17.11.41.

S.I.O. H.Q. R.A.F. M.E.: Senior Intelligence Officer, Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East.