No enemy opposition encountered.

APPENDIX "I" 240 TO : HQ MAAF (attention 23rd SCORU) HQ NATAF (attention 2nd Command Unit 23rd SCORU) SAOA SAAF FROM : SIO 21 Squadron SAAF REF : 21S/658 DATE : 5th May, 1944 OPREP No 658 for period ending 10.00 hrs on 5/5/44 REF MAP ITALY 1:100,000 Sheet 137 Viterbo 12 Balts off from Biferno (with 223 Sqdn) by 07.10 hrs., to bomb an AMMO Dump at A630310 near Orte. Escort of 18 Spits were unable to rendezvous at Venafro and 21 Squadron, misinterpreting a deviation signal proceeded without escort to their primary target, which was attacked from 11,300 feet on a course of 170 degs at 08.32 hrs. Main concentrated pattern of of bombs overshot, but one A/C which bombed early scored hits on and among buildings to North of target. No enemy opposition encountered. Target clear through breaks in cloud in target area; visibility hazy. All A/C back by 0926 hrs. B: (i) 9 Balts IV (ii) NIL (1) 3 Balts V (11) NIL C: NIL D: (i) 21.00 hrs (11) NIL (1) 07.00 hrs (11) NIL E: (1) 28800 x .30 2700 x .303 6300 x .50 (ii) & (111) NIL (1) 9600 x .30 900 x .303 2100 x .50 (11) & (111) NIL F: (1) 18 x 500 MC 27 x 250 GP (ii) as above (iii) & (iv) NIL (1) 6 x 500 MC 9 x 250 GP (11) as above (111) & (iv) NIL FUSED: 36 det 28 pist Tail 49 det 27 pist Nose to Z: NIL S.L. Boshoff ..........Lt for LtCol. O.C. 21 Squadron, S.A.A.F. (Handwritten note): F.L. Major Dalling

1944-05-05

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Form 541

MAP

Transcriber's Notes

Transcriber's Historical & Tactical Notes: * Command and Control Failure (The "Deviation Signal"): * The Incident: The report highlights a potentially catastrophic communication breakdown: "21 Squadron, misinterpreting a deviation signal proceeded without escort to their primary target". Standard doctrine dictated that if the fighter escort ("18 Spits") failed to rendezvous (R/V) at Venafro, the bombers should abort the deep penetration mission and attack a secondary target closer to the front lines. * The Risk: By proceeding to Orte (north of Rome) without cover, the squadron exposed itself to interception by Luftwaffe fighters. It was sheer luck—reported as "No enemy opposition encountered"—that prevented this mistake from becoming a tragedy. This mirrors the previous day's incident (May 4th) where an escort failure caused an abort, highlighting persistent coordination issues between the bomber stream and fighter wings during this week. * Targeting Difficulties (Orte Ammo Dump): * Orte Logistics: The target remained the vital Ammo Dump near Orte (Map Sheet 137 Viterbo). The Allies were determined to destroy this hub before launching Operation Diadem. * Bombing Accuracy: The stress of the unescorted run or hazy visibility likely contributed to the poor results: "Main concentrated pattern of bombs overshot". Only one aircraft, which dropped early, managed to hit buildings north of the target. "Overshooting" often occurred when bombardiers delayed release to ensure they didn't fall short, or if the ground speed calculation was slightly off. * Personnel: * Major Dalling: The handwritten note identifies "F.L. (Flight Leader) Major Dalling". As the leader, the decision to proceed unescorted (based on the misinterpreted signal) would have rested on his shoulders, though the report frames it as a squadron-level misinterpretation rather than individual error. * Abbreviations: * A/C: Aircraft. * MC: Medium Capacity (High Explosive). * GP: General Purpose. * Spits: Spitfire fighters. * R/V: Rendezvous. * O.C.: Officer Commanding. 28 Verification: Target File Verification: The document is dated 5th May, 1944 in the "DATE" field. It is a Sortie Report (No. 659) labeled APPENDIX "J" (page number 241), detailing the mission flown on the afternoon of May 5th, 1944.