SOLIMAN NORTH L.G. SORTIE REPORT
(Part A.)
R.A.F. Form 441 A.
'G' 149
Sheet No. 1
Oprep. Ref. No. 308
Date. 8 JUN 43
Squadron. 21 SAAF.
Type of Aircraft. 12 Baltimores (7 Mk. 111 & 5 Mk. 111A) See reverse.
Captain Formation Leader Maj. Schravesande
Crew. Lt. Campbell (Observer) See reverse.
Time Up. 0645 hrs. (1st. A/C)
Time Down. 0750 hrs. (Last A/C)
Total Time. 11 hrs. 00 mins.
Aerodrome or L.G. SOLIMAN NORTH L.G.
Type of Cloud. St.-Cu.
Amount of Cloud. 10/10 over KORBA area.
Base of Cloud. 500 ft.
Visibility. Good.
General Weather. Good.
Map or Chart Reference. French North Africa 1:500,000 TUNIS Sheet NJ.32.SE. PANTELLERIA Map Substitute Sheet 1A
Task or Duty. Medium level bombing attack on Battery position No. 17.
Time Height. Place. Narrative.
Base Airborne & circling.
2000 " S/C KORBA Town 120 M.
2000 KORBA Fighter escort did not appear. Made a five-minute circuit followed by a further half circuit of three minutes. Fighters still did not appear. 10/10 cloud at 500 ft. from KORBA Northwards over the peninsula.
2000 " S/C Base 300 M.
Base Last A/C landed.
PART B (on reverse) to be completed according to relevant pro-forma in H.Q. R.A.F. M.E. Instruction 34.
P.T.O.
Part "B" N/A
List of A/C and Crews:
F/L 142 P Maj. Schravesande, Lt. Campbell, F/Sgts. Meyer & Stopforth.
221 Y Lt. Eaton, Lt. McDermot, Sgt. Freestone (RNZAF) & F/Sgt. Gilda
(RAF)
368 X Lt. Clutterbuck, Lt. v.d. Meulen, F/Sgts. Raeburn & Carbarns.
V/L 167 S Capt. Smit, Lt. Kay, F/Sgts. Toms & Wright.
916 R Lt. Simpson, Lt. Handley, F/Sgts. Roberts & Shepperson.
291 U Lt. Hargrave, Lt. Rees, [strike-through: XX]Sgt. Jensen (RCAF) & F/Sgt. Bedford.
B/L 345 E Capt. McBride, Lt. Pickerill, F/Sgts. Daniels & White.
977 L Lt. Meredith, Lt. Herring, F/Sgt. Smith S.C. & F/Sgt. Prout(R
290 C Lt. Blieden, Lt. Rose, F/Sgts. Jarvis & Perkins.
V/L 930 K Lt. Hamilton, Lt. Whittle, F/Sgts. Hodgkinson & Phelan.
352 D Lt. Dugmore, Lt. Masters, F/Sgts. Maasdorp & Rogers C.L.
271 F Lt. Guard, Lt. Forssman, F/Sgts. Green & van Rooyen.
F/L Formation Leader. B/L Box Leader. V/L Vic Leader.
[Signature] ....................Capt.
S.I.O. 21 SQUADRON, S.A.A.F.
SORTIE REPORT
(Part A.)
R.A.F. Form 441 A.
'G' 149
Sheet No. 1
Oprep. Ref. No. 308
Date. 8 JUN 43
Squadron. 21 SAAF.
Type of Aircraft. 12 Baltimores (7 Mk. 111 & 5 Mk. 111A) See reverse.
Captain Formation Leader Maj. Schravesande
Crew. Lt. Campbell (Observer) See reverse.
Time Up. 0645 hrs. (1st. A/C)
Time Down. 0750 hrs. (Last A/C)
Total Time. 11 hrs. 00 mins.
Aerodrome or L.G. SOLIMAN NORTH L.G.…
__o_O_o__
Form 541 Transcriber's Notes Phase 2: Technical Expansion
Glossary of Terms
The document header identifies the record as an R.A.F. Form 441 A., representing a standard Royal Air Force Sortie Report, with the handwritten annotation 'G' 149 serving as a sequential archival filing reference. The abbreviation Oprep. Ref. No. signifies the Operational Report Reference Number. The designation 21 SAAF refers to 21 Squadron of the South African Air Force. The aircraft listed are Baltimores, indicating the Martin Baltimore twin-engine medium bomber, with the clerical typing Mk. 111 and Mk. 111A representing the Mark III and Mark IIIA variants. Military ranks are abbreviated as Maj. for Major and Lt. for Lieutenant. The abbreviation A/C serves as the standard nomenclature for Aircraft. The abbreviation L.G. expands to Landing Ground, specifically identifying the austere forward airstrip of SOLIMAN NORTH L.G.. Meteorological abbreviations include St.-Cu. for Stratocumulus clouds, with 10/10 indicating complete, unbroken cloud cover measured in tenths. Navigational abbreviations within the flight narrative include S/C for Set Course, with headings appended by M. to indicate Magnetic bearings. The administrative directives at the bottom margin refer to H.Q. R.A.F. M.E., which expands to Headquarters Royal Air Force Middle East, and P.T.O., an instruction to Please Turn Over the document to complete Part B.
Operational Context
This primary Sortie Report documents a recalled tactical mission executed by 21 Squadron SAAF on the morning of June 8, 1943, during the operational parameters of Operation Corkscrew. The Mediterranean Allied Air Forces were actively engaged in a sustained, concentrated aerial reduction of the fortified Italian island of Pantelleria to neutralize coastal defenses threatening the maritime approaches to the Strait of Sicily prior to the invasion of Europe. The formation of twelve Martin Baltimore bombers , under the command of Formation Leader Major Schravesande, was specifically tasked with a medium-level bombing attack against the coastal artillery emplacement designated as Battery position No. 17.
The flight narrative illustrates the critical reliance on coordinated multi-national airspace management and the severe operational friction caused by adverse maritime weather patterns. After launching from Soliman North Landing Ground and establishing a holding pattern, the bomber formation set course at 2,000 feet for the designated rendezvous point over Korba Town. Upon arrival at the Korba way-point, the mandatory allied fighter escort failed to integrate with the strike package. Major Schravesande directed the formation through an initial five-minute holding circuit, followed by a secondary three-minute circuit, while awaiting the fighters. The failure of the escort to appear was directly attributed to the dense meteorological conditions, specifically an unbroken 10/10 layer of stratocumulus cloud cover sitting at a low base of 500 feet extending northwards over the Cap Bon peninsula . Operating standard doctrine, which prohibited unescorted daylight medium bomber penetrations into the heavily defended airspace over Pantelleria due to the high probability of Luftwaffe or Regia Aeronautica interception, the formation leader officially aborted the mission. The bombers established a return magnetic heading of 300 degrees and safely recovered all twelve aircraft at the base by 0750 hours without engaging the target or expending ordnance.
194
Phase 1: Verification & Extraction
Identity Check
There is no explicitly printed date in a designated 'Date' column on this specific page.
Phase 2: Technical Expansion
Glossary of Terms
The abbreviation N/A signifies Not Applicable, formally indicating the absence of combat data for this specific recording section. The acronym A/C designates Aircraft. Standard military ranks are abbreviated as Maj. for Major, Capt. for Captain, Lt. for Lieutenant, F/Sgts. for Flight Sergeants, and Sgt. for Sergeant. Tactical flight formation positions are outlined by F/L for the Formation Leader, B/L for the Box Leader, and V/L for the Vic Leader, which defines the commander of a three-aircraft element . The integration of multinational Commonwealth personnel is explicitly documented through the abbreviations RNZAF for the Royal New Zealand Air Force, RAF for the Royal Air Force, and RCAF representing the Royal Canadian Air Force. The document's authorization is signed by the S.I.O., or Squadron Intelligence Officer, representing the S.A.A.F., standing for the South African Air Force. A clerical anomaly is preserved where the typist struck through erroneous characters prior to inserting Sergeant Jensen's rank and name, and the page margin physically truncates the nationality designation following Flight Sergeant Prout.
Operational Context
This archival document constitutes the crew roster and Part "B" continuation of a standard Royal Air Force Sortie Report. The prominent application of "N/A" across the top of the form confirms that the standard tactical metrics usually recorded in this section—such as target coordinates, ordnance expenditure, bombing accuracy, anti-aircraft artillery concentrations, and fighter interception profiles—are entirely not applicable. Administratively, this blank status definitively verifies that the mission was recalled or aborted, and the strike package of twelve Martin Baltimore medium bombers failed to engage its intended target and returned to base with unexpended ordnance. Despite the total absence of a combat narrative, the detailed inventory of aircraft letters and their respective four-man crews provides vital demographic intelligence regarding the Desert Air Force's operational structure. The deliberate interleaving of attached personnel from New Zealand, Great Britain, and Canada directly into South African Air Force bomber crews illustrates the profound structural integration required to maintain crew readiness and sustain the high-tempo, attritional aerial bombardment strategy across the Mediterranean theater.
195
Phase 1: Verification & Extraction
Identity Check
The exact date found in the document is 9 JUN 43.