Operational Order No. 7

Thursday, 2 October 1941

1941-10-02

SECRET.21 SQUADRON OPERATIONAL ORDER NO. 7. COPY NO..6....(Ref. Medium Bomber Wing Op. Order No. "A" 54.) DATE. 2. 10. 41Personal Briefing by Maj. Galgut.MAP REF: Tobruk 1:500000LIST OF APPENDICES. "B"INFORMATION. Well dispersed Dump consisting of M.T. and fuel, grownout of all proportions since arrival of ship in BardiaHarbour. The Landing Ground Bir-El-Baheira shouldbe avoided.Briefing by Commanding Officer and Squadron IntelligenceOfficer. At 0915 hours.INTENTION. High Level attack by 9 Aircraft. Bombing from 15000 ft.( No. 1 Flight ) 15500' ( No. 2 Flight ) 16000 ft.( No. 3 Flight ).EXECUTION (a) List of Aircraft and crews see appendix "B"(b) o/c "A" Flight will provide 4 Aircraft.o/c "B" Flight will provide 5 Aircraft.(c) Time of starting up 1130 hours.(d) Time of take off 1145 hours.(e) Formation: Squadron, Flights line astern.(f) Route: Landing Ground 21 - Fuka point - 295 degrees -turn in to cross coast at Ras-El-Kera.(g) Approach: From seaward at 20000 ft. 5 miles beforereaching Coast No. 1 Flight will signal, and flightswill dive towards Target to 15000 ft. 15500 ft. and16000 ft. respectively, attacking from North, NorthWest and West. If Fighters are reported, leaderwill signal as arranged and Target will be attackedfrom North in Squadron. Flights line astern.(h) After release: After release evasive action for 10seconds, then fly straight and photograph. Thenformate into previous formation. ( Squadron Flightsline astern.)(i) Photography: 4 cameras.(j) Landing order: Order of take off.ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS.(a) All Aircraft must carry full capacity fuel and oil.(b) All magazines and pans to be fully loaded.(c) Each aircraft will carry full bomb load i. e.8 X 250 lbs. Fuse N. ( inst.)(d) All necessary desert equipment.INTER COMMUNICATION. W/T Officer.ACKNOWLEDGE.DISTRIBUTION LIST.

H. Q. RAF. ME. S. I. O.

204 Intelligence.

204 Ops.

Medium Bomber Wing S. I. O.

War Diary.

File.[handwritten signature] L Saunders. Lt.For Officer Commanding 21 Sqdn.

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Original page(s): 66

Transcriber's Notes

Phase 2: Technical Expansion (The "Transcriber's Notes") Glossary of Terms * 21 SQUADRON S.A.A.F.: No. 21 Squadron, South African Air Force. Based at Landing Ground 21 (LG 21) in Egypt, the unit operated Martin Maryland medium bombers during the Western Desert Campaign. * BA-BH (MARTIN BALTIMORE): The R.A.F./SAAF operational code for the Martin Baltimore bomber. While the user context notes a later transition to the Baltimore (BA-BH) in 1942, during October 1941, the unit was equipped with the Martin Maryland, the technical and tactical predecessor utilized for high-level horizontal bombing. * FUSE N. (INST.): Nose Fuse (Instantaneous). A mechanical detonator designed to initiate the explosive train immediately upon impact with the surface, optimized for surface targets like vehicle dumps and fuel stores. * MC/GP (MEDIUM CAPACITY / GENERAL PURPOSE): Standard Allied ordnance types. The order specifies a full load of 8 x 250 lbs General Purpose (GP) bombs. * MET: Meteorological data. Precise MET conditions were critical for the high-altitude approach at 20,000 feet and subsequent dives to bombing altitudes between 15,000 and 16,000 feet. * M.T.: Motor Transport. * W/T: Wireless Telegraphy. Operational Context Operational Order No. 7, dated 2 October 1941, details a high-level strike against a strategic Axis supply depot. The target is identified as a massive "dispersed Dump" containing motor transport (M.T.) and fuel, which had expanded significantly following the unloading of shipping in Bardia Harbour. Strategically, this dump represented the vital mobile reserves for Rommel's Panzergruppe Afrika. Allied operations in early October 1941 were focused on neutralizing these logistical concentrations to degrade the Axis' ability to maneuver or sustain an offensive ahead of the British winter offensive, Operation Crusader. Execution Constraints The mission profile dictated complex tactical coordination. Nine aircraft were organized into three flights, with "A" Flight providing 4 airframes and "B" Flight providing 5. The approach was planned from seaward at 20,000 feet to mask the squadron's intent and avoid land-based detection until the final turn at Ras-El-Kera. The order details specific dive-bombing heights (15,000 ft, 15,500 ft, and 16,000 ft) to ensure vertical separation between flights during the simultaneous attack from the North, Northwest, and West. A contingency plan was established for fighter interception: if engaged, the squadron was to abandon the multi-directional approach and attack in "line astern" from the North. Technical requirements included a mandatory 10-second evasive action post-release before stabilizing the airframes for photographic assessment using 4 cameras. The administrative directive to avoid Bir-El-Baheira suggests the presence of significant Axis ground defenses or fighter landing grounds in that sector. 68 Phase 1: Verification & Extraction Identity Check: 2. 10. 41.