Operational Order No. 12

Tuesday, 14 October 1941

1941-10-14

S E C R E T. 21 SQUADRON OPERATIONAL ORDER NO. 12. COPY NO...7.... ( Ref: H. Q. 204 Group Operation order "A" 669 ) DATE: 14. 10. 41. MAP REF: Target Map B./2 and Benghazi and Tobruk 1: 500000 LIST OF APPENDICES. "B" INFORMATION. Benghazi Harbour has been raided many times at night, but not recently by day. In consequence all ships now come in at dawn and leave again in the evening. Fighters except possibly a small standing patrol, are unlikely to be met and the A/A defences ( which are known to be formidable) will almost certainly be taken by surprise. Briefing by the C. O. and S. I. O., explanation of target map B./2 and information re the refuelling at L. G. 075 by Maj. Fowler. INTENTION. High level bombing Benghazi Harbour - Docks - Water front - Buildings - Shipping. EXECUTION. (a) Course out: 021 L. G. to 075 L. G. (276 degrees) 075 L. G. to 20 miles South of Fort Maddelina (235 degrees) Fort Maddalena to Marshes (265 deg.) Marshes to Benghazi ( 312 deg.) (b) List of Aircraft and crews see appendix "B" (c) o/c "A" Flight will provide 6 aircraft o/c "B" Flight will provide 3 aircraft (d) Time of starting up 0900 hours (e) Time of take off 0914 hours (f) Land at L. G. 075, fill up, and take off at 1130 h. (g) Formation: Flights in Squadron "Vic" (h) Climb to 12000 ft. in rich, then cruise in lean at 1700 r.p.m. at 24" boost. (i) At 30 miles this side Marshes, climb in rich to 22000 ft. (j) About 50 miles from target, leader waggle wings and Flights will go line astern. (k) If no Fighters seen - the following attack. (1) 10 - 15 miles this side of target, No. 1 Flight will dive to 19000 ft. and attack Giuliana docks. (2) Nos. 2 and 3 Flights will open out slightly and dive to 19500 ft. and 20000 ft. respectively and attack right hand docks. N. B. Flights should at all times stay as close as possible. (3) If anyone observes Fighters, form line astern and bomb right hand docks. (l) Evasive Tactics - A/A: It will be a surprise but immediately after release each Flight will turn about 20 deg. left and dive slightly. Nos. 2 and 3 Flights diving to get into position. Time of flight of A/A shell at least 15 seconds. Then straight and use cameras. (m) Leader to wait at 2200 r.p.m. and when in formation make away on a course of 55 deg. at high speed for 50 miles, slowly losing height to 10000 ft. (n) When safe and about 100 miles away, fly Squadron "Vic" flights, at 1700 r.p.m. at 26" boost. (o) When approaching line, go into line astern again for safety. (p) If at L. G. 075 aircraft still have 40 gals. left, come straight home, otherwise land and in flights refuel and come home. Each Pilot to check exact amount of petrol taken. /2.

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Original page(s): 79

Transcriber's Notes

Phase 2: Technical Expansion (The "Transcriber's Notes") Glossary of Terms * 21 SQUADRON S.A.A.F.: No. 21 Squadron, South African Air Force. During October 1941, the unit operated the Martin Maryland medium bomber, a twin-engine airframe utilized for high-altitude horizontal bombing. * A/A: Anti-Aircraft artillery fire. The order identifies the Benghazi A/A defenses as "formidable," with a projected shell time-of-flight of at least 15 seconds at the planned bombing altitudes. * C. O. / S. I. O.: Commanding Officer and Squadron Intelligence Officer. * L. G. 021 / L. G. 075: Landing Ground 21 (base) and Landing Ground 75 (forward refuelling point). LG 075 was utilized to extend the range of the Marylands for the deep-penetration strike on Benghazi. * R.P.M. / BOOST: Revolutions Per Minute and manifold pressure (measured in inches of mercury). These represent the power settings for the Maryland’s Pratt & Whitney Twin Wasp engines. * VIC / LINE ASTERN: Tactical flight formations. "Vic" is a standard three-aircraft "V" formation; "Line Astern" involves aircraft following one another in a vertical or horizontal column, utilized here for the bombing run and as a defensive posture if fighters were encountered. Operational Context Operational Order No. 12, dated 14 October 1941, initiates a rare and strategic daylight strike against Benghazi Harbour. Strategically, Benghazi was the primary deep-water port for Rommel’s Panzergruppe Afrika in Cyrenaica. While the port was frequently targeted by night bombers, this daylight operation sought to capitalize on tactical surprise, as Axis forces typically moved shipping in at dawn and out by evening. Neutralizing the docks, shipping, and waterfront buildings at Benghazi was essential to the Desert Air Force’s broader interdiction campaign. By destroying logistical infrastructure and maritime assets at this terminal point, the Allied command intended to severely constrain Axis fuel and ammunition supplies prior to the launch of Operation Crusader. Execution Constraints The mission profile dictated extreme technical and navigational discipline. Nine aircraft were organized into two flights ("A" and "B"), requiring a mid-mission landing at L. G. 075 to refuel for the long-range transit. The approach was planned to avoid detection, with the formation climbing to 22,000 feet 30 miles before the marshes and then transitioning to a tactical dive for the attack. Specific bombing heights were staggered between 19,000 and 20,000 feet to saturate the Giuliana and "right hand" docks. Evasive action was mandatory post-release: flights were to turn 20 degrees left and dive slightly to defeat the predicted fire of the heavy A/A batteries. A critical constraint was fuel management; the order specifies cruise settings ("lean" at 1700 r.p.m. and 24" boost) and a "rich" mixture for combat power during the climb. Pilots were instructed to land and refuel again at L. G. 075 on the return leg if their fuel gauges registered less than 40 gallons. The note on the bottom of the page indicates a continuation (/2.) for further technical or crew data. This order, signed by Lt. L. Saunders, represents one of the most complex and long-range tactical undertakings for 21 Squadron during the 1941 campaign. 81 Phase 1: Verification & Extraction Identity Check: There is no 'Date' column on this specific page. However, this document is page 2 (continuation) of Operational Order No. 12, which is dated 14. 10. 41. on the preceding page.