Operational Order No. 22

Wednesday, 5 November 1941

1941-11-05

120 [handwritten]5 [handwritten]21 SQUADRON OPERATIONAL ORDER NO. 22. COPY NO.....(Ref. Operation order No. "A" from 261 Wing) DATE: 5.11.41MAP REF: Target map B./2LIST OF APPENDICES. "A"INFORMATION. The North West corner of Berka Aerodrome is one mileSouth East of Benghazi Harbour. Primary importanceis attached to the dumps of stores at "33" and to thestores at "37". The hangars at "19", and the Barracksand M.T. at "21", are also important target areas.Considerable quantities of petrol are known to bestored in the vicinity, and also Military supplies.Recognition should be assisted by the relative positionsof the cemetary, and the shape of the Landing Ground,and the hangars. Large transport planes may be seenin this corner of the Landing Ground.Benina Landing Ground is eleven miles away on the mainBarce road. On both the outward and return journeys,crews must endeavour to observe and pinpoint correctly,M.T., camps etc.Briefing by C.O. and S. I. O.INTENTION. High level bombing Stores, hangars and Dumps, NorthWest corner of Benghazi Landing Ground. Alternativetarget, dumps and hangars at Benina Landing Ground.EXECUTION. (a) List of aircraft and crews see appendix "A"(b) o/c "B" Flight will provide 6 aircraft(c) Time of starting up 0745 hours.(d) Time of take off 0755 hours.(e) Course out: L. G. 75, 20 miles South of Maddalenaacross desert, cross coast 35 miles South ofBenghazi, turn North, and come in just Southof the town, to attack target from South West.(f) Flying instructions: As briefed by C. O. Usualfuel economy tips.(g) Approach and Attack: From South West. AllObservers to release independently.(h) After release: Formation to turn to starboard,open up and head for home. Leader will ascertainlater by W/T whether any Pilot needs to refuel atL. G. 75.(i) Photography: 4 cameras(j) Mickey Mouse: 592 ft. at 250 m.p.h.(k) Landing order: Order of take off.ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS.(a) All aircraft must carry full capacity fuel and oil.(b) All magazines and pans to be fully loaded.(c) Each aircraft to carry full bomb load, i.e.8 x 250 lbs. Fused 43 Det.(d) All necessary desert equipment.INTER COMMUNICATION. W/T Officer.DISTRIBUTION.

Intelligence A.H.Q.W.D.

Operations do

S.I.O. 261 Wing

War Diary

File[handwritten signature] L Saunders Lt.For C. O. 21 Squadron.

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Original page(s): 120

Transcriber's Notes

Phase 2: Technical Expansion (The "Transcriber's Notes") Glossary of Terms * 21 SQUADRON S.A.A.F.: No. 21 Squadron, South African Air Force. During November 1941, the unit was equipped with the Martin Maryland, a twin-engine medium bomber utilized for high-altitude daylight interdiction. * 261 WING / A.H.Q.W.D.: 261 Wing, Air Headquarters Western Desert. These higher tactical commands coordinated Allied air operations in the North African theater. * C. O. / S. I. O.: Commanding Officer (Lt. Col. Jan Pretorius) and Squadron Intelligence Officer (Lt. L. Saunders). * FUSED 43 DET.: Fuse No. 43 Detonator. This specific fuzing was utilized for the 250 lb General Purpose (GP) bombs to ensure effective detonation against logistical targets like hangars and store dumps. * L. G. 75: Landing Ground 75. A forward refueling strip essential for extending the range of the Marylands for deep penetration strikes into Cyrenaica. * MICKEY MOUSE: The bomb intervalometer used by the observer to set the physical distance (592 ft.) between bombs in a "stick" at a specific ground speed (250 m.p.h.). * M.T.: Motor Transport. * W/T: Wireless Telegraphy (radio communication). Operational Context Operational Order No. 22, dated 5 November 1941, tasks 21 Squadron with a high-level strike against the Axis logistical hub of Benghazi, specifically targeting the Berka Aerodrome. Strategically, Benghazi was the primary port for Eastern Libya; its neutralization was vital to the Allied interdiction campaign intended to starve the Afrikakorps of fuel and supplies prior to Operation Crusader (commencing 18 November 1941). The primary objective was the destruction of store dumps "33" and "37," hangars, and petrol supplies at Berka. Suppression of this infrastructure aimed to hinder the dispersal and sustainment of Axis air reinforcements, including "Large transport planes". The identification of Benina Landing Ground as an alternative target reflects the MAAF's priority to degrade Axis air operations across the Benghazi sector. Execution Constraints The mission profile highlights the extreme technical and navigational demands of unescorted medium bomber sorties. * Long-Range Navigation: The formation was required to follow a deep desert route through L. G. 75 and Maddalena, crossing the coast 35 miles south of Benghazi to achieve tactical surprise by attacking from the southwest. * Independent Release: Unlike earlier missions where the formation released on the leader, all observers were ordered to release independently, likely to ensure a wider straddle of the dispersed store dumps. * Combat Friction: The underlying operational report (No. 22) confirms this mission became a major running battle. Despite "iced up windows" and intense anti-aircraft fire, the six Marylands listed for this strike made a "perfect run up," but subsequently faced heavy interception by Messerschmitt Bf 109s and Fiat CR.42s. * Logistical Risk: The provision for refueling at L. G. 75 was critical, as the distance to Benghazi pushed the Maryland's fuel endurance to the limit, particularly under combat conditions. The order, signed by Lt. L. Saunders, represents a methodical effort to degrade the Axis supply pivot in Libya despite the high probability of heavy fighter opposition. 134 Phase 1: Verification & Extraction Identity Check: 6. 11. 41.