Operational Order No. 9

Sunday, 5 October 1941

1941-10-05

S E C R E T.21 SQUADRON OPERATIONAL ORDER NO. 9. COPY NO...7....( Ref: Medium Bomber Wing OP. Order No. "A" 65. ) DATE: 5. 10. 41.MAP REF: Tobruk 1 : 500000LIST OF APPENDICES: "B"INFORMATION. A dump at 494407, on the Bardia - Tobruk road, whichthis Squadron has already attacked twice. Last minuteinstructions indicate that the South West corner, inand alongside the Wadi, is the most important partof the Target.Briefing by Commanding Officer and S. I. O. at 0815 hours.INTENTION. High level attack by 9 Aircraft. Heights, 12000 ft.,12500 ft. and 13000 ft.EXECUTION. (a) List of Aircraft and crews see appendix "B"(b) o/c "A" Flight will provide 6 Aircraft.o/c "B" Flight will provide 3 Aircraft.(c) Time of starting up 0920 hours.(d) Time of take off 0935 hours.(e) Formation: Squadron, Flights line astern.(f) Route: Landing ground 021 - Fuka Point - 292 degrees-turn in to cross coast at Ras - El - Aora.(g) Approach: Approach from North at 16000 ft., anddiving to 12000ft, 12500 ft. and 13000 ft., turnEast and attack parallel to, and 400 yards, Northof the road. If Fighters are reported, leader willsignal as arranged and Target will be attacked inSquadron, Flights line astern.(h) After release: Turn slightly, to allow Gunners totake oblique photos, reform into original formation,and return overland crossing the wire South ofSidi - Omar.(i) Photography: 4 cameras.(j) Landing order: Order of take off.ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS.(a) All Aircraft must carry full capacity fuel and oil.(b) All magazines and pans to be fully loaded.(c) Each Aircraft will carry full bomb load i. e.8 X 250 lbs. Fuse N. ( inst.)(d) All necessary desert equipment.INTER COMMUNICATION. W/T Officer.ACKNOWLEDGE.[handwritten signature] L Saunders. Lt.For O. C. 21 SQUADRON.

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Original page(s): 72

Transcriber's Notes

Phase 2: Technical Expansion (The "Transcriber's Notes") Glossary of Terms * 21 SQUADRON S.A.A.F.: No. 21 Squadron, South African Air Force. In October 1941, the unit operated as a light/medium bomber force within the Western Desert Air Force, specifically utilizing the Martin Maryland. * FUSE N. (inst.): Nose Fuse (instantaneous). This mechanical detonator was utilized to ensure the bomb exploded on the surface to maximize blast damage against unarmored targets like fuel dumps and transport vehicles. * LANDING GROUND 021: The squadron's forward operating base in Egypt, also designated as LG 21. * O.C. / S.I.O.: Officer Commanding and Squadron Intelligence Officer. * W/T: Wireless Telegraphy, referring to the aircraft's radio communications equipment. * WADI: A dry riverbed or ravine that provided natural concealment for Axis logistical stores in the desert terrain. Operational Context Operational Order No. 9, issued on 5 October 1941, documents the third consecutive strike by 21 Squadron against a specific Axis supply dump located at grid 494407 along the Bardia - Tobruk road. Strategically, this dump served as a primary receiving and distribution point for fuel and logistics recently offloaded from merchant shipping in Bardia Harbour. The Allied strategy during this period focused on the systematic destruction of Rommel's mobile fuel reserves to prevent a counter-offensive and to weaken Axis frontier garrisons before the launch of Operation Crusader. The intelligence provided for this mission was highly specific, noting that "last minute instructions" identified the South West corner and the adjacent Wadi as the most critical target sectors. This reflects the iterative nature of the campaign, where previous post-strike photographic analysis (from the raids of 2 and 4 October) informed subsequent targeting to ensure the complete neutralization of the logistical node. Execution Constraints The mission profile dictated a high-level horizontal approach at 16,000 feet from the North, with a subsequent dive to bombing altitudes staggered between 12,000 and 13,000 feet. This tactical descent was designed to achieve both vertical and horizontal separation of the flights, complicating Axis ground defense tracking and ensuring saturation of the target zone. A notable tactical constraint was the flight path: the formation was ordered to attack parallel to and 400 yards North of the road, likely to avoid flying directly over known anti-aircraft batteries positioned to protect the thoroughfare. For the return leg, the formation was tasked with an overland route, crossing "the wire"—the barbed wire frontier fence between Egypt and Libya—South of Sidi - Omar, a known navigational and military fix. As with previous missions in the Bardia sector, the threat of Luftwaffe interception remained a primary concern, with a standing order to maintain "Squadron, Flights line astern" formation if fighters were sighted to provide mutually supporting defensive fire. 74 Phase 1: Verification & Extraction Identity Check: 5.10.41.