APPENDIX "J" — Orders & Appendices

Document

The National Archives' reference AIR 27/271/2
APPENDIX "J"

FROM : S.I.O. 21 SQUADRON S.A.A.F.
TO : H.Q. M.A.A.F. ( ATTENTION OPERATIONS RECORDS)
H.Q. M.A.T.A.F. ( SCORU)
S.A.O.A. ADV. S.A.A.F. H.Q. C.M.F.
W.I.O. 3 SA WING S.A.A.F.
REF. : 21S/944
DATE : 25th FEBRUARY, 1945
OPREP NO. 944 FOR THE PERIOD ENDING 2100 HRS. ON THE 24th FEBR. 1945.
REF. MAP ITALY 1:100,000 SHEET 39 - PORDENONE.

OPERATION No. 154/21S/M.

A : 11 Marauders airborne from Jesi L/G at 1300 Hrs. to bomb
the R/R Bridge at PORDENONE at B.992078. Each A/C carried 6 x 500
and 4 x 250 lbs bombs. Of this load 90% was fused long delay, the
delays being 72 hrs. (16 Bombs) 36 hour - (27 Bombs) 12 Hour - (51 Bombs)
and 6 Hour (5 Bombs). One bomb in each A/C was fused instantaneous.
Object of the raid was to prevent the enemy working on the bridge
to repair damage done by the fighter bombers. The formation made r/v
at PORTO CORSINI at 1323 hrs. with a close escort of 6 Spits. and
arrived over target at 1432 hrs. First Box's Bombs undershot with
5 - 600 yards right error. Second Box straddled target area with
one marker bomb bursting about 100 yards south of the bridge. Stick was
200 yards long. One marker bomb in stick from third box fell about
300 yards beyond the bridge, but stick straddled western approaches.
All bombs of one A/C Jettisoned in the sea 15 to 20 miles east of
Venice. Window and pamphlets supplied by P.W.B. were dispensed in
vicinity of target. Two bursts inaccurate HAA from GRADO. Visibility
was hazy but weather good. All A/C down by 1548 hrs.
B : (i) 11 Marauders III (ii) Nil
C : (i) 8 (ii) Nil
D : (i) 28.25 hrs (ii) Nil
L : (i) 37400 x .50 (11) & (111) Nil
P : (i) 66 x 500 lbs Fused:- Delay-72,36,12 and 6 Hrs.
44 x 250 lbs 11 bombs Fused:- 27-49 Nose
30-36 Tail
(ii) 60 x 500 lbs (22 Pkts Pamphlets dropped
40 x 250 " 432 Lbs Window Dropped)
(iii) 6 x 500 " (iv) Nil
4 x 250 "

Q to V : Nil
W : (i) 3 Marauders III (ii) Nil
X : (i) 2.35 Hrs. (ii) Nil
Y : (i) 16 x 10 lbs Practice
Z : Nil
[Handwritten Signature: S.F. Wyllie]
LT. CAPT.
S.I.O. 21 SQUADRON S.A.A.F.

Transcriber's Notes

Phase 2: Technical Expansion (Transcriber's Notes)
Glossary of Terms:
* S.I.O.: Squadron Intelligence Officer.
* H.Q. M.A.T.A.F. (SCORU): Headquarters, Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force (Statistical Control and Operational Research Unit).
* W.I.O. 3 SA WING: Wing Intelligence Officer, 3rd South African Air Force Wing.
* OPREP: Operational Report.
* R/R Bridge: Railroad Bridge.
* Jesi L/G: Jesi Landing Ground, the primary operational base for the squadron during this period.
* r/v: Rendezvous.
* Spits: Supermarine Spitfire fighters used for close escort.
* HAA: Heavy Anti-Aircraft fire (Flak).
* P.W.B.: Psychological Warfare Branch.
* Window: Chaff; aluminized strips dropped to interfere with enemy radar-controlled gunnery.
* Marauders III: British Commonwealth designation for the Martin B-26G Marauder medium bomber.
Operational Context:
The raid of 24 February 1945 (reported on the 25th) on the Pordenone railroad bridge (grid B.992078) exemplifies the sophisticated interdiction tactics of "Operation Bingo". The specific use of "long delay" fuses—ranging from 6 to 72 hours—was a calculated strategy to hamper German engineering units attempting to repair damage inflicted by previous fighter-bomber strikes. By staggering detonations over several days, the MAAF intended to make the site too hazardous for sustained reconstruction efforts, thereby maintaining the severance of German logistical lines in North-Eastern Italy.
The strategic importance of such interdiction has its roots in the earlier mountain campaigns of November 1943. During the assault on the Bernhardt Line, 21 Squadron—then operating Martin Baltimores—focused on immediate tactical strikes at bottlenecks like the Mignano Gap and grid H055630 to prevent the reinforcement of the 10. Armee. While the 1943 raids provided direct support to break a static defensive line, the 1945 missions like the strike on Pordenone were part of a theater-wide logistical strangulation. The objective was to induce a total collapse of the German rear-echelon before the final Allied spring offensive by isolating the front from its primary rail-based supply routes.
Interpretations of Marginalia and Markings:
* Folio Number "68": Stamped archival index number in the upper right quadrant, following the record sequence in AIR 27/271/2.
* "APPENDIX 'J'": Identifies this OPREP as a formal annex to the primary February 1945 narrative.
* Officer Signature: The document is signed by Lieutenant S.F. Wyllie, acting S.I.O.. A strike-through appears over the printed rank "CAPT." with "LT." and "21" handwritten above and below, confirming the officer's actual rank and unit affiliation at the time of report.
* Marker Bomb: The use of "marker bombs" by the formation box leaders illustrates the method of visual targeting refinement used by medium bombers to improve strike accuracy over hazy targets.
* Ghosting: Significant bleed-through of typed text is visible from the preceding or following page in the archival folder, a common artifact of wartime paper stock.

16
The following archival entry constitutes a high-fidelity transcription and historical analysis of the specified document from the official war diary of 21 Squadron, South African Air Force (SAAF), currently held by The National Archives under reference AIR 27/271/2.
Phase 1: Verification & Extraction
Identity Check: The exact date recorded in the 'DATE' column of the image is 26th. FEBRUARY , 1945.