APPENDIX "F" — Orders & Appendices

Document

The National Archives' reference AIR 27/271/2
APPENDIX "F"

FROM : S.I.O. 21 SQUADRON S.A.A.F.
TO : H.Q. M.A.A.F. ( ATTENTION OPERATIONS RECORDS)
H.Q. M.A.T.A.F. ( SCORU)
S.A.O.A. ADV. S.A.A.F. H.Q. C.M.F.
W.I.O. 3 SA WING S.A.A.F.
REF. : 21S/940
DATE : 22nd FEBRUARY, 1945.
OPREP NO. 940 FOR THE PERIOD ENDING 2100 HRS. ON THE 21st FEB. 1945.
REF. MAP ITALY 1:100,000 SHEET 64 - ROVIGO

OPERATION NO. 150/21S/M.

A : 8 Marauders with two Anti-Flak a/c briefed to attack the Nervesa
Rail Diversion, but after crews were already in dispersal bays
the target was changed to MONSELICE M/Yards at G.233318 and
formation took off at 1445 hrs. with each A/C carrying 6 x 500
and 4 x 250 lbs bombs of which 9 fused six and 12 hrs. delay and one
demo. From Ravenna northwards 10/10 cloud at 13000' was encountered
and formation proceeded to Cervia and contacted "MATTOCK" with
a view to carrying out a RADAR Raid. After two courses to steer
had been given, formation lost contact and returned on reciprocal
to vicinity of CERVIA. Another attempt was then made but the
effort again proved abortive due to bad communication. Further All
pilots of formation reported poor reception. Further attempts
were abandoned due to the possibility of failing light at base.
Formation jettisoned all bombs in sea about 15 miles N.E. of
CERVIA at about 1615 hrs. and returned to base. Slight fairly
accurate HAA encountered above cloud between FERRARA and LAKE
COMACCHIO - 3 A/C holed (Cat.I). Last A/C down at 1740 hrs.
B : (i) 8 Marauders III (ii) Nil
C : (i) 8 (ii) Nil
D : (i) 21.20 hrs. (ii) Nil
L : (i) 27200 x .50 (ii) & (111) Nil
P : (i) 48 x 500 (11) Nil (111) as in (1) (1v) Nil
32 x 250
Fusing:- 5 Bombs 12 Hr. delay
34 Bombs 6 Hr. delay
9 Bombs 27 - 49 Nose, 30 - 36 Tail
U to V : Nil
W : (i) 5 Marauders III (ii) Nil
X : (i) 4.55 hrs (ii) Nil
Y : 24 x 10 Lbs. Practice Bombs.
Z : Nil.
S.L. Boshoff
Capt.
S.I.O. 21 SQUADRON S.A.A.F.

Transcriber's Notes

Phase 2: Technical Expansion (Transcriber's Notes)
Glossary of Terms:
* S.I.O.: Squadron Intelligence Officer.
* M.A.T.A.F. (SCORU): Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force (Statistical Control and Operational Research Unit).
* W.I.O. 3 SA WING: Wing Intelligence Officer, 3 South African Air Force Wing.
* OPREP: Operational Report.
* MONSELICE M/Yards: Monselice Marshalling Yards, a strategic rail junction south of Padua.
* 10/10 cloud: Complete cloud cover; total obscuration of the ground.
* MATTOCK: Callsign for a ground-based Radar Control station used to direct blind-bombing operations.
* Reciprocal: A flight path heading exactly 180 degrees opposite to the current course.
* HAA: Heavy Anti-Aircraft fire (Flak).
* Cat.I: Category I damage; aircraft damaged by enemy action but repairable at the squadron level.
* Demo: Demolition fuse; instantaneous high-explosive detonation.
* Marauders III: British Commonwealth designation for the Martin B-26G Marauder medium bomber.
Operational Context:
The abortive mission of 21 February 1945 (reported on the 22nd) underscores the significant technological and environmental challenges faced by the MAAF during the final winter of the Italian Campaign. The transition from the Nervesa Rail Diversion to the Monselice Marshalling Yards indicates the fluidity of tactical targeting during "Operation Bingo," as Allied command sought to capitalize on any weakness in German rail logistics. The attempt to utilize "MATTOCK" for a RADAR-guided raid highlights the push for all-weather capability, though the failure due to poor communications was a common friction point in the MTO.
The strategic necessity of these strikes parallels the requirements of November 1943 during the assault on the Bernhardt Line. In 1943, 21 Squadron—then flying Martin Baltimores—focused on immediate tactical interdiction at bottlenecks like the Mignano Gap and grid H055630 to isolate German units of the 10. Armee. By February 1945, the use of long-delay fuses (6 and 12 hours) against rail hubs like Monselice was a sophisticated evolution intended to hamper repair efforts and sustain logistical pressure even when weather prevented active sorties, thereby maintaining the systemic collapse of German rear-echelon resources prior to the spring offensive.
Interpretations of Marginalia and Markings:
* Folio Number "64": Stamped archival index number in the upper right quadrant.
* "APPENDIX 'F'": Identifies this OPREP as a formal annex to the primary February 1945 war diary narrative.
* Archival Stamp: The Public Record Office (now The National Archives) reference scale and copyright notice are visible on the right margin.
* Fusing Note: The detailed breakdown of delay fuses (5 x 12 Hr. and 34 x 6 Hr.) in section P illustrates the tactical intent to disrupt German repair cycles long after the aircraft had departed the target area.
* Authentication: The document is signed by Captain S.L. Boshoff, the Squadron Intelligence Officer.

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The following archival entry constitutes a high-fidelity transcription and historical analysis of the specified document from the official war diary of 21 Squadron, South African Air Force (SAAF), currently held by The National Archives under reference AIR 27/271/2.
Phase 1: Verification & Extraction
Identity Check: The exact date recorded in the 'DATE' column of the image is 23rd FEBRUARY, 1945.