[Routine Order] SQUADRON ROUTINE ORDER No. 28/44 continued.

Sunday, 2 April 1944 Other

Document

SQUADRON ROUTINE ORDER No. 28/44 continued.
PAGE THREE.
Para. 106. AERODROME CONTROL : RADIO TELEPHONY. (continued)
(e) Alternative and Other Landing Grounds. In view of the
almost universal use of R/T control on landing grounds, pilots will
endeavour to establish ...t contact with the Control on the landing
ground being used, before landing and any subsequent take-off.
Should the call sign of the landing ground be unknown, the word
"Control" will be used and the aircraft's position in relation to the
landing ground being called will be given in the call. Under no
circumstances must the name of the landing ground or adjacent town
be used.
(f) As no wireless watch is kept at night, one member of the
Duty Crew must be available throughout the night to listen for
aircraft in the circuit area.
(g) DISPERSAL.
Dispersal areas will be available as follows:-
(1) North-West end of runway, space for 2
aircraft.
(2) South East end, space for 2 aircraft.
(Signature illegible) LT. COL.
COMMANDING, 21 SQUADRON, S.A.A.F.

Transcriber's Notes

Transcriber's Historical & Tactical Notes:
* Communications Security (COMSEC):
* Anonymity on the Air: Paragraph 106(e) emphasizes strict radio discipline. Pilots were forbidden from using the actual name of the airfield or the nearby town (e.g., "Biferno" or "Campomarino") over the radio. Instead, they had to use the generic callsign "Control" if the specific code was unknown. This prevented German signals intelligence (SIGINT) from mapping Allied airfield locations simply by listening to voice traffic.
* "Universal Use": The note about the "almost universal use of R/T (Radio Telephony) control" reflects the modernization of air traffic control by 1944. Earlier in the war, or at more primitive strips, visual signals (flares, panels) were primary; now, voice radio was the standard, allowing for dynamic management of busy airspace.
* Night Operations:
* The Human Ear: Paragraph 106(f) reveals a technological limitation: "no wireless watch is kept at night". This implies the control tower or radio truck wasn't manned 24/7 with a radio operator. Instead, a member of the "Duty Crew" had to physically "listen for aircraft in the circuit area". If they heard an engine, they presumably had to wake up the officer or fire a flare to guide the lost aircraft in. This low-tech backup was critical for saving aircraft that might return late or damaged.
* Airfield Layout (Dispersal):
* Limited Space: The order designates specific "Dispersal areas" at the "North-West end" and "South East end" of the runway, but notes "space for 2 aircraft" at each. This indicates that Biferno was a crowded or relatively small tactical strip, with limited hardstanding for parking transient aircraft.
* Abbreviations:
* R/T: Radio Telephony (Voice radio).
* Lt. Col.: Lieutenant Colonel.
* S.A.A.F.: South African Air Force.

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Verification:
Target File Verification: The document is dated 3rd April 44 in the "DATE" field. It is a Sortie Report (No. 617) labeled APPENDIX "C", detailing the mission flown on April 3rd, 1944.