[Routine Order] "G1" — Orders & Appendices

Document

"G1"

SQUADRON ROUTINE ORDER NO. 12/43 Middle East Command.
100
by

LIEUT. COL. C.S. COPPEN D.F.C.
------------------------------
Officer Commanding
No. 21 Squadron S.A.A.F.
Middle East
21st. February 1943.

COURT OF ENQUIRY.
-----------------

Para: 29
A Court of Inquiry, constituted as under, will
assemble at a time and place to be decided by the President
to enquire into and report upon the injuries sustained by
No. C288952 Pte. van Vught J. on September 24th. 1942.
CONSTITUTION:
President: Maj. F.C. Hunt

Member: Lt. J.R. Millar

WITNESSES:
The Adjutant No. 21 Squadron S.A.A.F. will warn
all witnesses to attend and will arrange for the production
of relative documents.

FINDING:
The Court will make a finding.

PROCEEDINGS:
Proceedings will be delivered to the Officer
Commanding No. 21 Squadron S.A.A.F. for disposal.

(Handwritten Signature: [Illegible]) Major.
Adjutant No. 21 Squadron S.A.A.F.
Middle East "H1"

21 Squadron S.A.A.F. -----------
-------------------- 21/Feb./43
101
BALTIMORE TRAINING
******************
The Squadron received 3 Baltimores late in March 1942, and training

on them commenced at the beginning of April. At this time little was known about
this type of a/c and it had rather a bad reputation. Its two major faults were a
tendency to drop a wing on landing, with a subsequent left hand swing. At the time
many of our pilots already had experience on Marylands, and this facilitated their
conversion on to this type.
It was soon discovered that the major faults of dropping a wing and
swinging could be overcome by carrying out wheel landings instead of three pointers.
The use of brakes at high speed was deprecated, and the immediate use of brake to
correct a tendency to swing was emphasized. The use of engine to correct a swing
was discouraged at all times. The wheel landing prevented the stalling of the left
wing, and keeping the tail up as long as possible by easing the control column forward
gave adequate rudder control down to a comparatively low speed, when the tendency to
swing is minimised. At this low speed a slight touch of brakes is very effective.
Pilots were instructed to attempt every landing without the use of brakes.
On arrival at the Squadron, a new Pilot is issued with a complete
set of landing notes, and he does not commence flying until he is thoroughly
conversant with the necessary technical details and cockpit drill of the a/c. Having
been tested on these points, he is then taken up, standing in the passage of the
wireless operator's compartment with a view of the cockpit over the pilot's shoulder.
Circuits and landings are carried out until he feels confident, after having watched
the full actions of the pilot and the readings of the various instruments. He then
taxies the machine and gets accustomed to the feel of the brakes, which are inclined
to be a little severe. After this he takes off and flies around for about 20 minutes
until he becomes used to the feel of the machine, when he carries out a landing.
Pilots are instructed not to do turns with full flaps; but to lower their flaps on
the straight approach to land. If the first landing is considered satisfactory he
carries out several more before flying with his crew.
Strict supervision is maintained at all times over flying training
by experienced pilots who are encouraged to give younger pilots advice and every
assistance. Even in operations all flying is supervised and as far as possible
any fault is brought to the notice of the pilot concerned.
NIGHT/..........
2.

21 Squadron S.A.A.F. : Baltimore Training (Contd) 102
NIGHT FLYING:
Night flying training was started very cautiously as the a/c was

reputed to be unsuitable owing to the swing, the vicious stall, the the distortion
of the pilot's vision through the curved perspex. It was also considered to be
impossible to navigate the machine owing to the poor visibility and distortion
through the navigator's perspex.
Firstly the Commanding Officer and two Flight Commanders went up under
ideal conditions, and were favourably impressed, and it was decided to continue
training with the younger pilots. Amongst these we found a decided tendency to
undershoot in landing - probably due to lack of experience in night flying generally.
it was therefore decided to place guiding lights in the form of an isosceles triangle
in line with the flare path about a mile before the chance light. This was tried out
by the experienced pilots who found that passing over the triangle at 600 feet with
flaps and undercarriage down resulted in correct approach, and did away with the
possibility of submarine approaches and of undershooting the flarepath. in effect
this worked out very well, and the trouble did not recur.
All pilots were impressed with the necessity of going on to
instruments as the machine is about to become airborne. Before flying at night, all
pilots were given practice at instrument flying with a 'safety pilot' in the nose
and a hood clipped over the interior of the cockpit. This serves to give a pilot
confidence in his instruments and accustom himself to concentrating on them. Before
flying at night, our pilots were required to pass a cockpit test blindfold, and to sit
in the cockpit at night and study the position of the cockpit light switches, lights
and instrument needles. For example, a pilot should know when the needles of the
boost guages and rev.counters are vertical, the machine is flying at 30 ins. hg at
2000 r.p.m. - the correct readings for climb immediately after take off.
For training purposes the use of hooded operational flares is not
advised, and open lights should be used. Notwithstanding, however, pilots should be
told to do their circuit on their gyro compass.
Night a/c Modifications:
* The panel shade which prevents the reflection of the instruments on the
perspex was found to cause a faint shadow across the front perspex which could
easily be mistaken for a false horizon on a dark night. This was the cause of
several very near accidents; but the danger was overcome by broadening the shade
another 9 ins., and taking care that the whole shade was maintained a deep black.
* The indicator and warning lights in the cockpit are in all cases far too bright
for/..........
3.

21 Squadron S.A.A.F. : Baltimore Training (Contd) 103
for night work, and must be covered by adhesive tape or other suitable
material.

NIGHT OPERATIONS:
Before starting night operations an experienced pilot and observer

carried out a cross country flight in order to check the visibility of the Navigator
for map reading purposes. It was found that the visibility from the Observer's cockpit
was highly satisfactory.
The first night operations were carried out from Gaina Landing Ground
in January 1943 again by the Commanding Officer and two Flight Commanders, all of
whom experienced ni difficulty. As a result it was decided to allow all trained
night flying crews to operate. The Squadron carried out a total of 69 sorties over
a period of 8 nights, with excellent results and without mishap. These raids were
carried out at a radius of 300 miles which is considered to be the absolute maximum
for safety. They involved a total of 256 operational hours.
At the time we only had 14 trained night flying crews; but advantage
was taken of the moon period to train a further 13 pilots at Soluch Landing Ground,
Lt
where they all passed out after successive nights of training.
The value of the aircraft has undoubtedly been enhanced by its
and
additional use as a night bomber in the M.E. In spite of the misgivings inspired
by the aircraft's early reputation, it has subsequently gained the full confidence
and admiration of the whole Squadron as a result of its performance in training and
in operations.
"I 1" 104
P O S T A G R A M
-----------------

To : H.Q. R.A.F. M.E.
From : S.I.O. 21 Squadron, S.A.A.F.
Serial No. : 21 Sqdn/204
Date : 21 FEB 43.
OPREP No. 204 for period ending 1800 hrs. 21 FEB 43.
----------------------------------------------------

A to K NIL.
COMM. : NIL.
T.O.O. 1800 hrs.

(Handwritten Signature: [Illegible]) Capt.
S.I.O. 21 SQUADRON, S.A.A.F.
"J 1"
P O S T A G R A M 105
-----------------

To : H.Q. R.A.F. M.E.
From : S.I.O. 21 Squadron, S.A.A.F.
Serial No. : 21 Sqdn/205
Date : 22 FEB 43.
OPREP No. 205 for period ending 1800 hrs. 22 FEB 43.
----------------------------------------------------

A to K NIL.
COMM. : NIL.
T.O.O. 1800 hrs.

(Handwritten Signature: [Illegible]) Capt.
S.I.O. 21 SQUADRON, S.A.A.F.
"K1"
P O S T A G R A M 106
-----------------

To : H.Q. R.A.F. M.E.
From : S.I.O. 21 Squadron, S.A.A.F.
Serial No. : 21 Sqdn/206.
Date : 23 FEB 43.
OPREP No. 206 for period ending 1800 hrs. 23 FEB 43.
----------------------------------------------------

A to K NIL.
COMM. : NIL.
T.O.O. 1800 hrs.

(Handwritten Signature: [Illegible]) Capt.
S.I.O. 21 SQUADRON, S.A.A.F.

Transcriber's Notes

Phase 2: Technical Expansion (The "Transcriber's Notes")
Glossary of Terms:
* S.A.A.F.: South African Air Force.
* LIEUT. COL. C.S. COPPEN D.F.C.: Lieutenant Colonel C.S. Coppen, Distinguished Flying Cross, the Officer Commanding (O.C.) of No. 21 Squadron S.A.A.F..
* Court of Enquiry / Court of Inquiry: A formal military board convened to establish the facts of a specific incident—in this case, a non-combat injury—and determine legal responsibility or negligence.
* Para: 29: Paragraph 29 of the formal Squadron Routine Orders for February 1943.
* Pte.: Private. This individual, J. van Vught, was a member of the attached Cape Corps, as evidenced by the "C" prefix in his service number.
* Maj. / Lt.: Major and Lieutenant, respectively.
* Adjutant: The staff officer responsible for the internal administration, discipline, and legal records of the squadron.
Operational Context:
Squadron Routine Order No. 12/43, issued on 21 February 1943, provides primary evidence of the administrative clearing phase within No. 21 Squadron S.A.A.F. during the transition between the Libyan and Tunisian theaters. Strategically, this period followed the capture of Tripoli on 23 January 1943 and marked a definitive operational pause for the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF). During late February, the Desert Air Force (D.A.F.) was utilizing this stasis to finalize personnel accounts and resolve legal backlogs before shifting forward to Landing Grounds (L.G.s) closer to the Tunisian border.
The convening of a formal Court of Inquiry for Private J. van Vught regarding injuries sustained on 24 September 1942 highlights a significant administrative "catch-up". The five-month delay in addressing this injury—sustained during the build-up to the Second Battle of El Alamein—illustrates the difficulty of maintaining legal oversight during high-intensity mobile warfare. Like other inquiries conducted during mid-February, establishling a formal "finding" was essential for medical discharge or pension considerations for the "Attached" personnel of the Cape Corps who provided the vital logistical backbone for the unit's Martin Baltimore light bombers.
This document, archived as Folio 100 in the AIR 27/274 series, represents the final administrative rigors performed in Tripolitania immediately prior to the squadron's return to nocturnal interdiction operations against the Mareth Line. It underscores the necessity of staff work in preserving the legal rights and "Total on Duty" strength of the 600-man unit as it prepared for the definitive drive into Tunisia.

122
Phase 1: Verification & Extraction
Identity Check: 21/Feb./43.
Phase 2: Technical Expansion (The "Transcriber's Notes")
Glossary of Terms:
* S.A.A.F.: South African Air Force.
* Baltimores: The Martin Baltimore, an American-built twin-engine light attack bomber. No. 21 Squadron utilized various marks of this aircraft (Mk. I, II, and III) throughout the North African campaign.
* a/c: Aircraft.
* drop a wing: A dangerous aerodynamic stall of one wing during the landing flare, leading to a sudden roll and potential ground loop.
* left hand swing: A directional instability on the ground where the aircraft veers sharply to the left, often exacerbated by engine torque and Narrow-track landing gear.
* Marylands: The Martin Maryland (Martin Model 167), the predecessor to the Baltimore, on which many S.A.A.F. pilots gained their initial twin-engine experience.
* wheel landings: A landing technique where the aircraft touches down on its main wheels while the tail is still flying, as opposed to a "three-pointer" where all wheels touch simultaneously.
* three pointers: A stall-landing where the main wheels and tailwheel touch the ground at the same time at minimum airspeed.
* circuits and landings: The repetitive practice of taking off, flying a rectangular pattern around the airfield, and landing to build pilot proficiency.
* full flaps: Maximum extension of the wing flaps to create high lift and high drag for landing.
Operational Context:
The memorandum "Baltimore Training," dated 21 February 1943, provides an essential technical retrospective of the squadron’s conversion to the Martin Baltimore. Strategically, this document was formalized during the final administrative consolidation in Tripolitania following the fall of Tripoli on 23 January 1943. The timing is critical; as the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) prepared for the definitive drive into Tunisia, ensuring that replacement pilots could safely operate the Baltimore from rough, forward Landing Grounds (L.G.s) was a priority for the Desert Air Force (D.A.F.).
The Baltimore's "bad reputation" regarding landing characteristics necessitated the specific "wheel landing" doctrine detailed in the text. By keeping the tail up, pilots maintained "adequate rudder control" to counter the aircraft's notorious tendency to swing, a vital requirement when operating from the narrow and often crosswind-affected strips of the Western Desert and Tunisia. This document reflects the institutional knowledge gained since April 1942, transitioning from Maryland experience to mastering the more powerful but temperamental Baltimore.
Furthermore, the emphasis on "Strict supervision" and "cockpit drill" underscores the squadron's effort to mitigate non-combat losses during the tactical pause in mid-February. As the unit shifted its weight toward the Mareth Line, the ability of pilots to land safely without relying on "severe" brakes—which often failed in desert heat—was paramount to maintaining the squadron's airworthy strength for high-intensity interdiction. This document, archived as Folio 101, serves as the definitive training standard as the squadron prepared for the Tunisian theater.

123
Phase 1: Verification & Extraction
Identity Check: 21/Feb./43. (Note: This document is page 2 of the memorandum "Baltimore Training" initiated on Folio 101).
Phase 2: Technical Expansion (The "Transcriber's Notes")
Glossary of Terms:
* S.A.A.F.: South African Air Force.
* a/c: Aircraft. Specifically referring to the Martin Baltimore light bomber.
* swing: Directional instability during takeoff or landing where the aircraft veers sharply, a known hazard of the Baltimore's design.
* vicious stall: A sudden and severe loss of lift, often resulting in a wing drop, which was particularly dangerous during the low-speed landing phase.
* perspex: Acrylic glass used for the cockpit canopy and navigator's station; curved sections caused significant optical distortion for the aircrew.
* chance light: A powerful mobile floodlight used to illuminate the touchdown zone of a flare path during night landings.
* submarine approaches: A slang term for an approach flown dangerously low, often below the intended glide path.
* boost guages: Instruments measuring the manifold pressure of the engines in inches of mercury (ins. hg) to determine power output.
* rev.counters: Tachometers indicating engine speed in revolutions per minute (r.p.m.).
* gyro compass: A non-magnetic directional instrument essential for maintaining accurate headings during night circuits.
Operational Context:
This second page of the "Baltimore Training" memorandum, dated 21 February 1943, details the specialized nocturnal doctrine developed by No. 21 Squadron S.A.A.F. to overcome the inherent technical deficiencies of the Martin Baltimore. Strategically, the Desert Air Force (D.A.F.) was transitioning from the pursuit across Libya to the tactical interdiction of Axis supply lines in Tunisia. As the squadron’s primary mission involved high-intensity night raids—the "road purification" of enemy Mechanical Transport (M.T.)—mastering night operations from rough forward landing grounds (L.G.s) was vital for the upcoming offensive against the Mareth Line.
The document highlights the dangerous optical illusions caused by instrument reflections on the perspex, which were mitigated by broadening the "panel shade" by 9 inches to prevent "false horizons". The implementation of the "isosceles triangle" lighting system further illustrates the improvisational nature of desert operations, providing pilots with a spatial reference to prevent "undershooting" the flare path.
Furthermore, the requirement for pilots to pass "blindfold" cockpit tests and perform "submarine approach" prevention exercises reflects the administrative and technical rigor applied during the February operational pause. This systematic approach was intended to reduce non-combat attrition among "younger pilots" as the unit consolidated its airworthy strength for the definitive drive into Tunisia. This document, archived as Folio 102, stands as the finalized nocturnal standard for Baltimore aircrew in the Mediterranean theater.

124
Phase 1: Verification & Extraction
Identity Check: 21/Feb./43. (Note: This document is page 3 of the memorandum "Baltimore Training" initiated on Folio 101).
Phase 2: Technical Expansion (The "Transcriber's Notes")
Glossary of Terms:
* S.A.A.F.: South African Air Force.
* experienced ni difficulty: Experienced no difficulty (typographical error in original).
* Gaina Landing Ground: A forward operational airfield in Libya utilized by the squadron during the January 1943 advance toward Tripoli.
* sorties: Individual aircraft combat missions.
* Soluch Landing Ground: An airfield located south of Benghazi, utilized as a rear-area training hub for aircrew conversion and night flying instruction.
* passed out: Successfully completed the required course of training and was certified for operational duty.
* M.E.: Middle East.
Operational Context:
This final page of the "Baltimore Training" memorandum, dated 21 February 1943, serves as a formal validation of the Martin Baltimore's efficacy as a nocturnal interdictor. Strategically, the document was finalized during the operational pause in Tripolitania following the fall of Tripoli on 23 January 1943. During this phase, the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) were transitioning from the pursuit across Libya to the high-intensity interdiction of Axis supply lines—the "road purification" missions—protecting the southern flank of the Allied advance into Tunisia.
The successful execution of 69 sorties from Gaina Landing Ground over eight nights in January 1943, covering a 300-mile radius without mishap, provided the tactical proof required to overcome the aircraft's "early reputation" for instability. This performance was critical for Allied operations, as it demonstrated the Baltimore could effectively strike Axis Mechanical Transport (M.T.) at a "radius of 300 miles," which was the absolute safety limit for twin-engine light bombers in the desert.
Furthermore, the training of an additional 13 pilots at Soluch Landing Ground during the "moon period" nearly doubled the squadron's trained night-fighting strength from 14 to 27 crews. This human and technical consolidation, conducted during the February tactical pause, ensured No. 21 Squadron entered the Tunisian Campaign with a fully validated nocturnal doctrine and an expanded roster of combat-ready aircrew. This document, archived as Folio 103, represents the final technical endorsement of the Baltimore's role in the Desert Air Force (D.A.F.) prior to returning to active interdiction against the Mareth Line.

125
Phase 1: Verification & Extraction
Identity Check: 21 FEB 43.
Phase 2: Technical Expansion (The "Transcriber's Notes")
Glossary of Terms:
* H.Q. R.A.F. M.E.: Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East.
* S.I.O. 21 Squadron, S.A.A.F.: Senior Intelligence Officer of No. 21 Squadron, South African Air Force. This officer was responsible for the collation of tactical intelligence and the preparation of operational reports for the unit, then equipped with Martin Baltimore light bombers.
* Serial No. 21 Sqdn/204: The unique administrative serial number assigned to this specific postagram communication.
* OPREP No. 204: Operational Report Number 204, the standardized format for reporting a squadron's daily combat and operational results.
* A to K - NIL: Standardized sections of an operational report (covering targets, bomb loads, and results). The entry "NIL" confirms that no combat missions were executed by the squadron during the 24-hour reporting period ending at 1800 hours on 21 February 1943.
* COMM. : NIL: Communication flight. Indicates that no non-combat logistical, transport, or ferry flights were conducted by squadron aircraft during the reporting period.
* T.O.O. 1800 hrs: Time of Origin, recorded as 18:00 hours on 21 February 1943.
Operational Context:
OPREP No. 204 documents a continued state of tactical stasis for No. 21 Squadron S.A.A.F. during late February 1943. Strategically, this period represents the final logistical and administrative consolidation phase in Tripolitania following the capture of Tripoli on 23 January 1943 and the conclusion of the Western Desert Campaign in Libya. The Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) were currently reorganizing the Desert Air Force (DAF) to maintain pressure on the Afrika Korps as it withdrew into the Mareth Line defensive positions in southern Tunisia.
The "NIL" activity reported on 21 February 1943 coincides with a concentrated period of technical and administrative review within the unit. On this same date, the squadron formalized a comprehensive technical retrospective entitled "Baltimore Training," documenting the specialized "wheel landing" and nocturnal doctrine required to operate the Martin Baltimore effectively. Additionally, the unit was clearing administrative backlogs, including the convening of a Court of Inquiry into injuries sustained by Private van Vught of the attached Cape Corps.
The operational pause further allowed for the enforcement of strict desert discipline, such as the mandatory inclusion of photographs in personnel "Pay Books" and the detailing of officers to the airmen's mess to address morale and supply concerns. These administrative rigors ensured the 600-man unit maintained maximum readiness before returning to high-intensity interdiction operations in the Tunisian theater. This document, archived as Folio 104 in the AIR 27/274 series, serves as primary evidence of the administrative transition period as the squadron prepared for the upcoming offensive against Axis fortifications in Tunisia.

126
Phase 1: Verification & Extraction
Identity Check: 22 FEB 43.
Phase 2: Technical Expansion (The "Transcriber's Notes")
Glossary of Terms:
* H.Q. R.A.F. M.E.: Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East.
* S.I.O. 21 Squadron, S.A.A.F.: Senior Intelligence Officer of No. 21 Squadron, South African Air Force. This staff officer was responsible for the synthesis of tactical intelligence and the preparation of operational reports for the unit, which at this time was predominantly equipped with Martin Baltimore light bombers.
* Serial No. 21 Sqdn/205: The unique administrative serial number assigned to this specific postagram communication.
* OPREP No. 205: Operational Report Number 205, the standardized format for documenting a squadron's daily combat results and tactical activity.
* A to K - NIL: Standardized sections of an operational report covering tactical data such as targets, times, and bomb loads. The "NIL" entry confirms that no combat sorties were executed by the squadron during the 24-hour reporting period ending at 1800 hours on 22 February 1943.
* COMM. : NIL: Communication flight. Indicates that no non-combat logistical, ferry, or transport missions were conducted by squadron aircraft during the reporting period.
* T.O.O. 1800 hrs: Time of Origin, denoting the official filing time of the report at 18:00 hours on 22 February 1943.
Operational Context:
OPREP No. 205 documents the continuation of the tactical pause for No. 21 Squadron S.A.A.F. in late February 1943. Strategically, this period marks the final administrative and logistical consolidation in Tripolitania following the fall of Tripoli on 23 January 1943. The Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) were utilizing this interval to reorganize the Desert Air Force (DAF) for high-intensity interdiction against the Mareth Line in southern Tunisia.
The "NIL" activity recorded on 22 February 1943 followed a brief logistical surge on 20 February involving 11 Martin Baltimores. During this phase of stasis, the squadron prioritized internal rigor, including the formalization of technical memoranda on "Baltimore Training" to mitigate the aircraft's notorious instability during landings and night operations. Simultaneously, the unit was clearing administrative backlogs, such as convening Courts of Inquiry for non-combat injuries and enforcing strict dress regulations to maintain Allied military prestige in occupied Libya.
This document, archived as Folio 105 in the AIR 27/274 series, represents the unit's status immediately prior to its full commitment to the Tunisian theater. The administrative focus during this period ensured that both the aircrew and the 600-man ground echelon were fully integrated and operationally ready for the definitive Allied drive against Axis fortifications.

127
Phase 1: Verification & Extraction
Identity Check: 23 FEB 43.
Phase 2: Technical Expansion (The "Transcriber's Notes")
Glossary of Terms:
* H.Q. R.A.F. M.E.: Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East.
* S.I.O. 21 Squadron, S.A.A.F.: Senior Intelligence Officer of No. 21 Squadron, South African Air Force. This staff officer was responsible for synthesizing tactical data and preparing official reports for the unit, which at this time was primarily operating Martin Baltimore light bombers.
* Serial No. 21 Sqdn/206: The unique administrative serial number assigned to this specific postagram communication.
* OPREP No. 206: Operational Report Number 206, the standardized format for documenting a squadron's daily combat results and tactical activity.
* A to K - NIL: Standardized sections of an operational report covering tactical data such as targets, mission times, and bomb loads. The "NIL" entry confirms that no combat sorties were executed by the squadron during the 24-hour reporting period ending at 1800 hours on 23 February 1943.
* COMM. : NIL: Communication flight. Indicates that no non-combat logistical, ferry, or transport missions were conducted by squadron aircraft during the reporting period.
* T.O.O. 1800 hrs: Time of Origin, denoting the official filing time of the report at 18:00 hours on 23 February 1943.
Operational Context:
OPREP No. 206 documents the sustained tactical stasis of No. 21 Squadron S.A.A.F. during late February 1943. Strategically, this period marks the conclusion of the Western Desert Campaign following the fall of Tripoli on 23 January 1943 and the final administrative consolidation in Tripolitania before the definitive drive into Tunisia. The Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) were utilizing this operational pause to reorganize the Desert Air Force (DAF) for high-intensity interdiction against the Mareth Line defensive positions in southern Tunisia.
The "NIL" activity recorded on 23 February 1943 reflects a period of internal preparation rather than combat engagement. During this phase, the squadron prioritized technical and human readiness, as evidenced by the formalization of technical memoranda on "Baltimore Training" intended to mitigate the aircraft's instability during landings and nocturnal operations. Additionally, the unit was actively clearing legal and administrative backlogs, including the convening of several Courts of Inquiry for non-combat injuries and the enforcement of strict dress regulations and city bounds in Tripoli to maintain Allied military prestige in occupied Libya.
This document, archived as Folio 106 in the AIR 27/274 series, represents the squadron's status immediately prior to its full commitment to the Tunisian theater. The administrative focus ensured that both the aircrews and the 600-man ground echelon were fully integrated and operationally prepared for the transition to forward Landing Grounds (L.G.s) and subsequent tactical bombing missions against Axis supply lines.

128
Phase 1: Verification & Extraction
Identity Check: 23rd February 1943.